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Note
A Balancing Act: the Virtue of a Light Touch
Regulatory Framework in the 2015 Open Internet
Order
Nia Chung Srodoski*
In 2010, users of Netflix, the streaming video service,
experienced slow connections and degraded video quality for
several weeks.1 This was largely the result of congestion in
Netflixs transit network.2 Because the congestion only got
worse, Comcast, a broadband provider that handles traffic flow
between the transit or content Internet service provider (ISP)
and the end-user3an eyeball ISPthrottled down the speed
at which content was being delivered to the usersthe end-
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1. See generally How Would You Rate Netflix Streaming Quality?,
HACKING NETFLIX (Aug. 28, 2010) http://www.hackingnetflix.com
/2010/08/how-would-you-rate-netflix-streaming-performance.html (positing
that there may be a link between using Comcast as your internet provider and
having slow or poor quality Netflix streaming and providing many comments
from users discussing these concerns). Cf. Timothy Stenovec, Is Your Netflix
Slow? This May Be Why, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 12, 2014, 7:49 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/02/12/netflix-slow-this-could-be-why_n
_4770058.html (describing why Netflix customers were experiencing degraded
video quality in 2014).
2. See generally Zachary M. Seward, The Inside Story of How Netflix
Came to Pay Comcast for Internet Traffic, QUARTZ (Aug. 27, 2014),
http://qz.com/256586/the-inside-story-of-how-netflix-came-to-pay-comcast-for-
internet-traffic/ (discussing how it was congestion in the transit network that
Netflix was using that lead to degraded streaming quality for end users).
3. Eyeball ISPs are the broadband providers between the end-user and
the rest of the Internet traffic exchange. See Richard T. B. Ma et al., On
Cooperative Settlement Between Content, Transit, and Eyeball Internet Service
Providers, 19 IEEE/ACM TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORKING 802, 802 (2011)
(defining eyeball ISPs and listing Comcast as an example of an eyeball ISP).
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users.4 Comcast then demanded Netflixa content ISPto
either enter into a paid peering arrangement with Comcast or
to upgrade to a Tier-1 transit network, a wider network that
would be able to handle Netflixs level of traffic.5 This dispute,
in addition to other challenges brought against eyeball ISPs,
led to a set of rules issued by the Federal Communications
Commission (the Commission), In the Matter of Preserving the
Open Internet Broadband Industry Practices, Report and Order
(2010 Open Internet Order), aimed to regulate broadband
provider activity.6 The 2010 Open Internet Order imposed
disclosure, anti-blocking, and anti-discrimination
requirements on broadband providers,7 which effectively
eliminated the ability of eyeball ISPs to intentionally block or
throttle any content, regardless of congestion level. A few years
later, however, the D.C. Circuit struck down portions of this
order,8 asserting that while the Commission did have
rulemaking authority, under the classification of broadband
providers as an information service, it could not regulate
broadband providers as a common carrier, and thus could not
4. Daniel A. Lyons, Internet Policys Next Frontier: Usage-Based
Broadband Pricing, 66 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 3334 (2013) (Comcast claimed
throttling was necessary because these networks created an unexpected spike
in demand for upload bandwidth, which imposed congestion costs on other
consumers who shared upload bandwidth with someone operating a peer-to-
peer network.).
5. See Brian Stelter, Netflix Partner Says Comcast Toll Threatens
Online Video Delivery, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2010, 6:13 PM),
http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/29/netflix-partner-says-
comcast-toll-threatens-online-video-delivery/ (discussing this new fee).
6. See generally In the Matter of Preserving the Open Internet
Broadband Industry Practices, Report and Order, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905 (adopted
Dec. 21, 2010), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-10-
201A1.pdf [hereinafter 2010 Open Internet Order] (discussing the incentive
and ability that broadband providers have to limit internet openness and
listing instances in which broadband providers have acted to limit openness).
7. KEVIN E. MCCARTHY, OLR BACKGROUNDER: APPELLATE COURT
DECISION ON NET NEUTRALITY 3 (2014), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2014/rpt
/pdf/2014-R-0033.pdf. See 2010 Open Internet Order, supra note 6, at 17906,
1793650.
8. See Verizon v. F.C.C., 740 F.3d 623, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that
the Commission did not have authority to regulate broadband providers as a
telecommunications service under Title II because the FCC had previously
determined that Internet broadband services were information services, and
thus, not subject to common carrier obligations, and vacating the anti-
discrimination and anti-blocking portions of the Order).
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implement anti-blocking and anti-discrimination rules.9 The
D.C. Circuit struck down rules enforcing anti-blocking and
anti-discriminatory practices enforced against eyeball ISPs.10
Accordingly, eyeball ISPs were free to block content or
intentionally throttle traffic from the end-user.11
Anti-blocking and anti-discrimination practices were
popularized as enforcing the idea of
net neutrality.12 Proponents of net neutrality maintained that
striking down these rules would result in unfair and
discriminatory practices from eyeball ISPs, such as prioritizing
companies that paid larger fees for faster service to the end-
user, by creating fast lanes.13 Net neutrality advocates also
argued that these fees would be shifted to end-users and the
public at large in the form of higher subscription fees, and that
net neutrality must be maintained to support fairness in
pricing and transparency in the marketplace.14 Other
9. Id. See generally Why Its Good That Broadband is Not Classified as a
Common Carrier, NCTA (Jan. 27, 2014), https://www.ncta.com/platform
/public-policy/why-its-a-good-thing-that-broadband-isnt-a-common-carrier/
([C]ommon carriers are private companies that sell their services to everyone
on the same terms, rather than companies that make more individualized
decisions about who to serve and what to charge.).
10. See Verizon, 740 F.3d at 659.
11. See Nisha Ragha, The Fall of Net Neutrality: The End of an Era and a
Call for Reform, 13 CARDOZO PUB. L., POLY & ETHICS J. 559, 585 (2015) (The
judgement essentially [gives] commercial companies the authority to block
internet traffic, give preferential treatment to specific internet services, and
steer users away from online content, based on their own commercial
interests.).
12. Cf. 2010 Open Internet Order, supra note 6, at 17906, 18056 (stating
that anti-blocking and anti-discrimination measures were necessary to
preserve the free and open internet and referring to the rules contained within
the Order as net neutrality rules).
13. See Ragha, supra note 11, at 58586 (detailing some of these potential
discriminatory practices); see also Bruce Kushnik, Fast Lane, Slow LaneNo
LaneEnd Game in Communications, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 23, 2014,
1:57 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bruce-kushnick/fast-lane-slow-
laneno-l_b_5865996.html (using the term fast lane).
14. Ragha, supra note 11, at 59293 (discussing how in the wake of
Verizon, deals between ISPs and content providers could result in higher
costs to end-users, if content and broadband providers look for ways to offset
the costs of these agreements.). See also Tim Wu, Network Neutrality,
Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141, 14179
(2003) (discussing what a network neutrality regime would look like and why
it should be adopted to promote fair competition); Free Press, Net Neutrality:
What You Need to Know Now, SAVE THE INTERNET,
http://www.savetheinternet.com/net-neutrality-what-you-need-know-now (last
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commentators, however, asserted that these rules and a
revisited order by the Commission would impede creativity,
innovation, and economic growth in a free market.15
In 2014, the Commission filed a notice of proposed
rulemaking, In the Matter of Protecting and Promoting the
Open Internet, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (2014 Open
Internet NPRM),16 which received over 3.7 million comments
during its commenting period, the largest volume of comments
experienced in Commission history.17 The Obama
Administration, individual consumers, and private companies
expressed legitimate concerns that, if the Commission failed to
enforce net neutrality rules and ban eyeball ISPs from
engaging in unreasonable network practices, consumers would
be subject to unreasonably discriminatory practices, such as
content blocking, content throttling, and paid prioritization
schemes.18 These rules were laid out in the 2014 Open Internet
visited Oct. 4, 2014) (Net Neutrality means an Internet that enables and
protects free speech. It means that Internet service providers should provide
us with open networksand should not block or discriminate against any
applications or content that ride over those networks. Just as your phone
company shouldnt decide who you can call and what you say on that call, your
ISP shouldnt be concerned with the content you view or post online.).
15. See Joshua Steimle, Am I the Only Techie Against Net Neutrality?,
FORBES (May 4, 2014, 10:09 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites
/joshsteimle/2014/05/14/am-i-the-only-techie-against-net-neutrality/
(discussing a need for competition to lower costs, and increase privacy and
freedom, and arguing against government regulation).
16. In the Matter of Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, 29 FCC Rcd. 5561, 55615659 (adopted May 15,
2014), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-14-61A1.pdf
[hereinafter 2014 Open Internet NPRM].
17. Dr. David A. Bray, An Additional Option for Filing Open Internet
Comments, OFFICIAL FED. COMMCNS COMMN BLOG (Sept. 11, 2014, 4:15 PM)
https://www.fcc.gov/blog/additional-option-filing-open-internet-comments
(The Commission welcomes the record-setting level of public input in this
proceeding, and we want to do everything we can to make sure all voices are
heard and reflected in the public record.); Julie Veach, Exploring New Ideas
for Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, OFFICIAL FED. COMMCNS
COMMN BLOG (Sept. 22, 2014, 12:29 PM), https://www.fcc.gov/blog/exploring-
new-ideas-protecting-and-promoting-open-internet (Our public comment
period ended on Monday . . . with more than 3.7 million comments and reply
comments submitted by a public that is passionate about this issue.).
18. See Office of the Press Secy, Statement by the President on Net
Neutrality, WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 10, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2014/11/10/statement-president-net-neutrality (If a consumer
requests access to a website or service, and the content is legal, your ISP
should not be permitted to block it . . . . Nor should ISPs be able to
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NPRM. In February 2015, the Commission, in a 3-2 vote,
released revised regulations, In the Matter of Protecting and
Promoting the Open Internet, Report and Order on Remand,
Declaratory Ruling, and Order (2015 Open Internet Order).19
First, the newly released order reclassified broadband
Internet access services (BIAS) as a telecommunications
service.20 Under this reclassification, the Commission is now
able to regulate BIAS as a common carrier under Section 706
and Title II authority.21 Utilizing its new authority to regulate
BIAS under Title II, the Commission then laid down three
bright-line rules: (1) no blocking; (2) no throttling; and (3) no
paid prioritization.22 Lastly, the order enforced sections that
pertained to the regulation of eyeball ISPs23 but granted broad
forbearance to a majority of other provisions in Title II, and
called its new directive a light touch regulatory framework.24
This Note will address how an understanding of the
Internet is imperative to understanding the full impact of the
intentionally slow down some content or speed up othersthrough a process
often called throttlingbased on the type of service or your ISPs
preferences . . . . I am also asking the FCC to make full use of the
transparency authorities the court recently upheld . . . . No service should be
stuck in a slow lane because it does not pay a fee. That kind of gatekeeping
would undermine the level playing field essential to the Internets growth. So,
as I have before, I am asking for an explicit ban on paid prioritization and any
other restriction that has a similar effect.); Brendan Greeley, Analysis: FCC
Should Undo 02 Error to Ensure Net Neutrality, MYSA (Jan. 17, 2014, 8:09
PM), http://www.mysanantonio.com/technology/article/Analysis-FCC-should-
undo-02-error-to-ensure-net-5154104.php (If the FCC actually wants to
ensure net neutrality, . . . [i]t has to unmake the mistake it made in 2002,
when it failed to classify cable Internet providers as telecommunications
services.); Free Press, supra note 14 (explaining the net neutrality issue in
laymans terms).
19. See In the Matter of Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet,
Report and Order on Remand, Declaratory Ruling, and Order, 30 FCC Rcd.
5601 (adopted Feb. 26, 2015), http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases
/Daily_Business/2015/db0312/FCC-15-24A1.pdf [hereinafter 2015 Open
Internet Order].
20. 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 19, at 56181 ¶ 59.
21. Id. at 5618 ¶ 59, 5721 ¶ 274.
22. Id. at 5646 ¶¶ 105106, 5647 ¶ 107.
23. 47 U.S.C. §§ 201202. See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 19,
at 572425 ¶¶ 28385 (detailing reasonable network management).
24. See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 19, at 5612 ¶ 37; 5618 ¶ 59
(describing their broad forbearance approach as a light-touch approach to
Title II use). The 2015 Open Internet Order also addressed a range of other
issues but this article will address only those provisions that pertain to net
neutrality.
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2015 Open Internet Order, how its provisions have addressed
the net neutrality debate, and how the Commission may have
struck the right balance the third time around.25 Section I of
this Note will provide a fundamental description of the
Internets infrastructure, such as the Internet backbone and
interconnection frameworks. It will illustrate how the Netflix-
Comcast arrangement materialized, how it led to the rules
addressing net neutrality, and what the Commission has done
in its light touch regulatory framework in the order to
prohibit eyeball ISPs from regulating last-mile connectivity.26
Section II will then explain how the Commission, in exercising
broad forbearance,27 may have intentionally left
interconnection unregulated to observe peering arrangements,
to ensure that reasonable network management practices are
being conducted in such agreements, and to maintain market
competition utilizing its case-by-case standard. It will then
propose that, if the Commission wants to regulate
interconnection, it should first revisit the 2015 Open Internet
Orders nomenclature and provide clear definitions for each
term so as to eliminate confusion during rule application. The
Commission can also broaden the scope of BIAS to include
Internet traffic exchange. This Note concludes by arguing that,
while the 2015 Open Internet Order left a majority of Title II
provisions untouched and allowed room to implement creative
paid peering arrangements between eyeball and content ISPs,
the Commission has struck the right balance in deciding to
grant broad forbearance to interconnection arrangements.
I. BACKGROUND
To understand the impact of the Commissions 2015 Open
Internet Order, it is imperative to establish a clear
25. See generally Ma et al., supra note 3, at 80203 (explaining the
relationships between content, transit, and eyeball Internet service providers
and how the Internet backbone works).
26. See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 19, at 5612 ¶ 37 (describing
their broad forbearance approach as a light-touch approach to Title II use).
27. Id. (Today, our forbearance approach results in over 700 codified
rules being inapplicable, a light-touch approach for the use of Title II. This
includes no unbundling of last-mile facilities, no tariffing, no rate regulation,
and no cost accounting rules . . . .); id. at 561618 ¶¶ 5159 (explaining
provisions with applicable broad forbearance). It is unclear whether last-mile
broadband provider rules apply to only connections made in the backbone or
also interconnection.
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understanding of the Internets framework. The Internet is
more complex than the media makes it out to be.28 It is not a
simple two-way interaction,29 but can instead be thought of as
a network of networks.30 The Internet is operated by
thousands of interconnected ISPs . . . [and] each ISP requires
the cooperation of other ISPs in order to provide Internet
services.31 This section will explain the three types of Internet
service providers, the two types of interconnection
arrangements, and the Commissions journey that led to the
2015 Open Internet Order.
A. THE INTERNET BACKBONE
Although there are various classification systems of
Internet infrastructure, essentially, there are three types of
Internet Service Providers (ISPs): eyeball ISPs, content ISPs,
and transit ISPs.32 These entities make up the Internet
backbone.33
28. Linda Crane & Vishal Misra, Net Neutrality is All Good and Fine; the
Real Problem is Elsewhere, COLUMBIA UNIV., http://www.cs.columbia.edu/2014
/net-neutrality/ (last visited March 31, 2015, 9:59 PM) (Economists have
typically analyzed and modeled the Internet as a two-sided market, with
consumers on one side and content providers on the other, and a single ISP
sitting in the middle serving them both. The reality even in 2008 was far more
complex . . . .); Telephone Interview with Tracy Beth Mitrano, Former
Director of IT & Policy, Cornell University (Nov. 21, 2014) (It seems like a lot
of people are oversimplifying the issue.).
29. See Crane & Misra, supra note 28.
30. Crane & Misra, supra note 28 (describing the internet as a vast maze
of inter-connected networks . . . .).
31. Ma et al., supra note 3. See also Dan Rayburn, How Transit Works,
What It Costs and Why Its So Important, STREAMING MEDIA BLOG (Feb. 24,
2014, 10:44 AM), http://blog.streamingmedia.com/2014/02/transit-works-costs-
important.html [hereinafter How Transit Works] (The Internet is made up of
a collection of networks, and in order to get traffic from one end user to
another, all service providers, hosting providers and ISP networks need to
have an interconnection mechanism. These interconnections, which allow the
sharing of traffic, can be either direct between two networks or indirect via
one or more other networks that agree to take the traffic. Many of these
network connections are indirect as most providers dont have a global
network footprint and as a result, the traffic will be sent through several
different interconnections to reach the end user.).
32. SeeMa et al., supra note 3, at 80203.
33. Crane & Misra, supra note 28 (describing the network of
interconnected ISPs that make up the Internet and referencing this network
as the Internet backbone).
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1. Content ISPs
Content ISPs, also known as edge providers,34 provide
content for the Internet at large.35 When an end-user requests
a webpage, the request is first sent to the content ISP in order
to generate content (i.e., html, images, video, text) to send back
to the end-user through the funnels described above (i.e., end-
user to content ISP to transit ISP to eyeball ISP and back to
end-user).36 When the Internet first came to fruition, simple
html files were the norm;37 thus, content traveled relatively
simply through the transit network utilizing basic application
servers.38 As the Internet started becoming more complex with
streaming video, images, and sound, however, content delivery
networks (CDNs) were created to handle distribution and
transmission over long distances.39
a. Content Delivery Network (CDN) Servers
The closer data is to users, the faster the end-users will
receive content.40 A CDN . . . is a network of servers located in
different parts [of the world] . . . that stores files to be used by
your website visitors.41 Content ISPs want their content to be
available to as many users as possible and to be able to send
34. 2010 Open Internet Order, supra note 6, at 17907 n. 2 (defining an
edge provider as providers of content, applications, services, and devices).
35. Crane & Misra, supra note 28.
36. Id.
37. DAVE RAGGETT ET AL., RAGGET ON HTML 4, Chapter 2 (2d ed. 1998),
http://www.w3.org/People/Raggett/book4/ch02.html (discussing the early
internet and how HTML became the norm for text format).
38. Cf. Athena Vakali & George Pallis, Content Delivery Networks: Status
and Trends, 7 IEEE INTERNET COMPUTING 68, 6869 (2003) ([CDNs] first
emerged in 1998 to address the fact that the Web was not designed to handle
large content transmissions over long distances . . . . CDNs can thus facilitate
content delivery for the Semantic Web, which primarily aims to extend
current Web content to computer-understandable content.).
39. Cf. Vakali & Pallis, supra note 38 (discussing how CDNs emerged in
response to the increased size and distance of content transmissions).
40. See Kyle Russell, Heres Why You Should Be Thrilled Netflix Is Paying
Comcast for Content Delivery, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 25, 2014, 7:55 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/paid-peering-explained-2014-2 (The closer
data is to users, the better performance theyll get.). Cf. Patrick Sexton,
Content Delivery Networks, VARVY, https://varvy.com/pagespeed/content-
delivery-networks.html (last updated Oct. 10, 2015) ([T]here is a measurable
amount of latency (waiting time) for a website user who is visiting a page that
is hosted thousands of miles away.).
41. See Sexton, supra note 40.
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their data to such users at the highest possible speeds.42 So
CDNs, like Akamai, place data centers globally either on
servers located within the eyeball ISP data centers or at third
party centers close by.43 In turn, CDNs will pay eyeball ISPs for
hosting their data.44 Tech giants have started to develop and
use their own CDNs, but many smaller companies currently
use off-the-shelf CDNs from either Amazon or those provided
by third-party transit ISPs.45
2. Transit ISPs
Transit ISPs own the global infrastructure and provide
transit services for other ISPs.46 For example, one of the
42. Id. (ranking page speed as the number two priority for most websites);
Russell, supra note 40 (Netflix (and other big companies that move around a
ton of content like Apple, YouTube or Microsoft) want to make their content
available to as many people as possible  ideally, to everyone with Internet
access.).
43. See Russell, supra note 40 (Companies like Akamai operate content
delivery networks, charging tech and media companies to host their content
on superfast servers located within Internet service provider data centers or at
third-party data centers close by. In turn, CDNs pay Internet service
providers for accepting their data.).
44. Id.
45. See Jon Brodkin, FCC Gets Comcast, Verizon to Reveal Netflixs Deals,
ARSTECHNICA (June 13, 2014, 12:15 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2014/06/fcc-gets-comcast-verizon-to-reveal-netflixs-paid-peering-deals/
(Direct network interconnections generally take place between ISPs and
content delivery networks and other large network operators. Generally, only
the biggest content providers, such as Google, Amazon, Facebook, Pandora,
eBay, or Apple have direct connections to ISPs. Netflix is the largest single
source of North American Internet traffic during peak viewing periods.); see
also Jon Brodkin, See Which ISPs Google, Microsoft, and Netflix Trade
Internet Traffic With, ARSTECHNICA (May 21, 2014, 11:00 AM),
http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/05/see-which-isps-google-
microsoft-and-netflix-trade-internet-traffic-with/ (listing the tech giants that
currently have direct network connections/peering agreements/paid
interconnection deals with eyeball ISPs); OECD, PIRACY OF DIGITAL CONTENT
19 (2009), http://sroc.info/files/2313/8391/0535/OECD_study_-_piracy.pdf ([A
peer-to-peer arrangement is a network] communication structure in which
individuals interact directly, without necessarily going through a centralised
system or hierarchy. Users can share information, contribute to shared
projects or transfer files.).
46. Crane & Misra, supra note 28. See also How Transit Works, supra
note 31 (There are a lot of transit providers in the market, but many get
confused as some companies just sell transit, while others sell a wider
portfolio of products. For example, one of Cogents core products is selling
transit, while others like Level 3 sell transit, but also VPN, CDN, WAN
optimization and a host of other managed services.).
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largest transit providers, Level 3, owns and leases cable
systems worldwide.47 [T]housands of miles of fiber [stretch] in
trenches across land and . . . . in cables on the seabed. In all,
[Level 3s] network contains approximately 180,000 miles of
fiberenough to circle the equator seven times.48 This fiber is
then altered to connect to data centers worldwide that Level 3
also owns or leases.49 The bandwidth is then sold as an
Internet Service to customers globally.50 Essentially, transit
ISPs are the middlemen that deliver content from content ISPs
to eyeball ISPs before eyeball ISPs deliver the requested
content back to the end-user.51 Depending on their individual
arrangements and available capacity, transit ISPs will receive
requests from either the eyeball or content ISP and send traffic
back to the specific requestor.52
3. Eyeball ISPs
Eyeball ISPs are Internet service providers that are
responsible for delivering content back to end-users; this
relationship is called last-mile connectivity.53 These Internet
47. Mark Taylor, Observations of an Internet Middleman, LEVEL 3 (May 5,
2014), http://blog.level3.com/open-internet/observations-internet-middleman/;
Press Release, Level 3 Issues Statement Concerning Internet Peering and
Cogent Communications, LEVEL 3 (Oct. 7, 2005), http://investors.level3.com
/investor-relations/press-releases/press-release-details/2005/Level-3-Issues-
Statement-Concerning-Internet-Peering-and-Cogent-
Communications/default.aspx (Level 3 . . . is an international
communications and information services company. The company operates
one of the largest Internet backbones in the world, is one of the largest
providers of wholesale dial-up service to ISPs in North America and is the
primary provider of Internet connectivity for millions of broadband
subscribers, through its cable and DSL partners.). Other large transit ISPs
include Qwest and Global Crossing.
48. Taylor, supra note 47.
49. Id. (That fiber is then turned into usable bandwidth by installing
equipment in data centers . . . .).
50. Id. (Level 3 uses that network to sell Internet Services to tens of
thousands of customers all around the world.).
51. Id.; Crane & Misra, supra note 28 (Since transit ISPs dont have
direct access to consumers, they arrange with the eyeball ISPs for the last-
mile delivery of content to customers.). Some ISPs can play multiple roles.
For example, Verizon acquired Tier-1 UUNET and can now function as both
an eyeball and transit ISP. Other Tier-1 ISPs are providing CDN services to
service content providers. Ma et al. supra note 3, at 803.
52. See Ma et al. supra note 3, at 80203 (explaining the relationship
between transit ISPs, content ISPs, and eyeball ISPs).
53. Id. at 802.
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service providers include Verizon, Comcast, Time Warner
Cable, and AT&T.54 The Commission also defines these ISPs as
broadband Internet access services (BIAS), the broadband
providers that provide Internet access in the last-mile, with the
last-mile being the last linkage or connection between the end-
user to the Internet via eyeball ISPs.55 Because eyeball ISPs
have little to no competition in the market, they are considered
oligopolies and often get a bad reputation in the mainstream
consumer market.56 The bulk of the Commissions recent
disputes with broadband providers have been with eyeball
ISPs.57
B. INTERCONNECTION ARRANGEMENTS
The Commission calls the connection between these ISPs,
Interconnection.58 To get content from a server on the other
side of the planet, IP packets59 (Internet protocol packets) have
54. Crane & Misra, supra note 28.
55. See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 19, at 560910 ¶ 25.
(defining eyeball type ISPs as broadband Internet access services and
describing their last-mile type connection between the end user and the
Internet).
56. See Deborah Solomon & Robert Frank, Comcast-AT&T Broadband
Deal Cements Rise of Oligopolies, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 21, 2001, 11:14 AM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1008888645236530160 (describing the lack of
competition for the major eyeball ISPs and how this lack of competition
between major eyeball ISPs has likely led to higher prices for consumers, and
referring to them as oligopolies).
57. 2010 Open Internet Order, supra note 6. See generally 2015 Open
Internet Order, supra note 19, ¶ 7 (noting how portions of the 2010 Open
Internet Order were held, in Verizon v. F.C.C., to violate the Communications
Act). The issue of net neutrality dealt with the allegedly unfair and
unreasonably discriminatory practices implemented by these eyeball ISPs.
Moreover, the Commissions attempts to regulate eyeball ISPs in the courts
have twice faced failure in the past. See, e.g., Verizon v. F.C.C., 740 F.3d 623,
628 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that it would be a violation of the
Communications Act for the FCC to regulate broadband providers as common
carriers); Comcast Corp. v. F.C.C., 600 F.3d 642, 644 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding
that the FCC failed to justify their authority to regulate an ISPs network
management procedures).
58. 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 19, at 5610 ¶ 28. See generally
Martin B. Weiss & Seungjae Shin, Internet Interconnection Economic Model
and its Analysis: Peering and Settlement, 6 NETNOMICS 43, 44 (2004) (There
are two types of Internet interconnection among ISPs and IBPs: peering and
transit.).
59. See Data Packet, TECHOPEDIA, https://www.techopedia.com/definition
/6751/data-packet (last visited Mar. 31, 2015, 9:43 PM) (A data packet is a
unit of data made into a single package that travels along a given network
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to travel through a series of backbone servers and public
network cables.60 When an end-user requests a webpage, (e.g.,
Netflix.com), eyeball ISPs (e.g., Comcast) can request content
from the content ISP utilizing a middleman, known as a transit
ISP, (e.g., Cogent or Level 3).61 Whereas eyeball ISPs serve
content to end-users, transit ISPs serve content between
content ISPs and eyeball ISPs,62 by selling transit.63 This is
called a transit agreement.64 On the other hand, if both entities
have the proper infrastructure in place, eyeball ISPs can
request and receive content directly from content ISPs through
a peering arrangement.65
1. Transit Agreements
Transit agreements involve multiple networks that depend
on each other for traffic exchange.66 Transit agreements can be
thought of as agreements that create Internet highways. Each
content ISP will enter into an agreement with the transit ISP
to deliver content through one of its lanes to send to the eyeball
path. Data packets are used in Internet Protocol (IP) transmissions for data
that navigates the Web, and in other kinds of networks.).
60. Rackspace Support, What is a CDN?, RACKSPACE,
http://www.rackspace.com/knowledge_center/article/what-is-a-cdn (last
updated May 13, 2015).
61. See Crane & Misra, supra note 28 (describing the relationship
between users, content ISPs, transit ISPs, and eyeball ISPs).
62. Id.
63. See Ma et al., supra note 3, at 803 (Transit ISPs . . . provide transit
services for other ISPs . . . ); see also Taylor, supra note 47 (Level 3 uses [its]
network [of thousands of miles of fiber cables] to sell Internet Services to tens
of thousands of customers around the world.).
64. Jean Walrand & Shyam Parekh, Communication Networks: A Concise
Introduction, in SYNTHESIS LECTURES ON COMMUNICATION NETWORKS 60
(Jean Walrand ed., 2010) (ebook) (In a transit agreement, one ISP provides
(usually sells) access to all destinations in its routing table.) (alteration in
original).
65. See Walrand & Parekh, supra note 64 (In a peering agreement, the
ISPs reciprocally provide free connectivity to each others local or inherited
customers.) (alteration in original). CDNs are cost-intensive and require
implementation of certain infrastructure on both ends of the agreement. See
generally Rebecca Wetzel, CDN Business ModelsNot All Cast from the Same
Mold, 31 BUS. COMM. R. 40 (2001) (describing the expenses associated with
CDNs).
66. See How Transit Works, supra note 31 ([A]ll the transit provider is
doing is allowing multiple networks to exchange traffic with one another.).
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ISP.67 Again, content then gets delivered through the last-mile,
from eyeball ISPs to the end-user.68 Partial transit can be sold,
on select routes, on-net routes, and more.69 ISPs can customize
transit packages based on the customers needs and requests.70
Depending on the transit package, the lanes on the Internet
highway can either narrow or widen.71 Having a little or a lot
of bandwidth available makes the difference between watching
a graphic-intensive Web page load in phases over a period of
several minutes, or having it pop into your window like a flash
of lightning.72 Increasing bandwidth (widening the lane)
allows more traffic to flow, increasing speed.73 Of course,
having a wider lane means paying higher prices, so the more
content your ISP is sending out, the more you are congesting
the highway and likely in need to purchase more transit to
decrease congestion.74
As described above, transit ISPs sell bandwidth to
customers around the world through the utilization of
customized transit packages. When transit ISPs, like Level 3,
sell Internet Services, however, they must make available all
Internet routes globally to their customers.75 Because Level 3
does not own every route connected to every data center in the
world, it must enter into connections with other networks.76
For example, if a Level 3 customer in Hong Kong wanted to
communicate with a Level 3 customer in Palo Alto, Level 3
would need to have the appropriate arrangements to meet that
67. See Crane & Misra, supra note 28 (describing the relationship
between users, content ISPs, transit ISPs, and eyeball ISPs).
68. See id.
69. How Transit Works, supra note 31 (When it comes to how transit is
sold, companies can buy full transit, partial transit, select routes, on-net
routes, etc. and ISPs will create the service and pricing around the customer
request.).
70. Id.
71. See id. (Transit deals vary greatly, in size, type, price and
performance . . . ).
72. Id.
73. R. Kayne et al., What Is Internet Bandwidth, WISEGEEK,
http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-internet-bandwidth.htm (last updated Sept.
20, 2015).
74. See How Transit Works, supra note 31 (discussing differences in
transit prices and listing the most common monthly rates in the U.S. as
ranging from $0.50 for 3000Mbps to $7.00 for 10Mbps).
75. Taylor, supra note 47.
76. Id.
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customers needs.77 To do this, Level 3 connects with other
networks through what is called a peering arrangement.78
2. Peering Agreements
When two networks work directly with each other, a
peering arrangement is established.79 To increase the speed
at which content is delivered back to the end-user, transit ISPs
strive to reduce the number of networks a packet has to
traverse so that it can reach its destination.80 Level 3 states
that it needs to connect to 51 peers in order to provide its tens
of thousands of customers access to the whole Internet.81
a. Settlement-Free Peering
Originally, because transit ISPs needed to connect to each
other for purposes of providing Internet service to customers
from locations they did not have access to, engineers create
settlement-free peering arrangements to exchange traffic as a
mutually beneficial agreement.82 Transit ISPs bear no
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See Rudolph van der Berg, How the Net Works: An Introduction to
Peering and Transit, ARSTECHNICA (Sept. 2, 2008, 10:11 AM),
http://arstechnica.com/features/2008/09/peering-and-transit/ (Peering: when
two or more autonomous networks Interconnect directly with each other to
exchange traffic. This is often done without charging for the interconnection or
the traffic.); How Transit Works, supra note 31 (Peering is between two
networks whereas transit allows you to connect to multiple networks.); see
also What Is Peering?, NETNOD, http://www.netnod.se/ix/what-is-peering (last
visited Nov. 1, 2015) (Peering is a process by which two Internet networks
connect and exchange traffic. It allows them to directly hand off traffic
between each others customers, without having to pay a third party to carry
that traffic across the Internet for them. Peering is distinct from transit, the
more usual way of connecting to the Internet, in which an end user or network
operator pays another, usually larger, network operator to carry all their
traffic for them.).
80. Taylor, supra note 47 (That is often referred to as the number of
hops; or number of other networks a packet has to traverse to reach its
destination. We strive to make that number as low as possible to offer our
customers the best performance; more hops can introduce more delay and
more potential for quality degradations when the other networks dont invest
enough in performance, redundancy and capacity.).
81. Id. (While Level 3 has tens of thousands of customers, it only has 51
peers. That total set of interconnections enables our customers to see the
whole internet.).
82. See van der Berg, supra note 79 (Peering . . . is often done without
charging for the interconnection or the traffic.); see also Amogh Dhamdhere et
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significant costs when entering into such settlement-free
peering agreements.83 With settlement-free peering, two
networks allow access to each others customers for free, and
the only cost is that of maintaining the peering link.84 In order
to maintain fairness in this type of arrangement, however,
transit ISPs must be ensured that the amount of traffic
exchange is roughly the same. 85
b. Paid Peering
A new form of peering, paid peering, has recently
emerged, wherein routing decisions are similar to settlement-
free peering, but one network charges the other an access fee.86
In such a relationship, the decision is not only about whether
to peer, but also [about] which network should pay the other,
and how much.87 Because a peering arrangement involves only
two networks exchanging traffic directly with each other, it in
turn cuts out the middleman and streamlines the traffic
exchange process.88 When considering whether to enter into
al., A Value-based Framework for Internet Peering Arrangements, 22
TELETRAFFIC CONGRESS (ITC) 1, 1 (2010) (With settlement-free peering, two
networks allow access to each others customers for free, and the only cost is
that of maintaining the peering link.).
83. Dhamdhere et al., supra note 82.
84. Id. (describing the difference between paid and settlement-free
peering arrangements). See also Taylor, supra note 47 (The vast majority of
those contracts are settlement free. For example, 48 of the 51 Level 3 peering
agreements are settlement free. In one case, a peer pays us for access to a
number of routes in a region where their network doesnt go; a choice they
made rather than buying Internet Services from another party. As we have
explained a number of times, our policy is to refuse to pay arbitrary charges to
add interconnection capacity . . . . ); NETNOD, supra note 79 (Peering
arrangements still need to be negotiated with each peer, but no new cabling
needs to be done.).
85. Press Release, supra note 47 (In order for free peering to be fair to
both parties, the cost and benefit that parties contribute and receive should be
roughly the same.).
86. See Raphael Leung, Paid Peering, Paid Prioritization, and the Nuance
of the Net Neutrality Debate, BENTON FOUNDATION (July 28, 2014, 3:07 PM),
https://www.benton.org/node/197702 (stating that peering agreements were
traditionally settlement-free, noting that paid peering arrangements between
providers have started to emerge, and describing the different circumstances
where each may be used).
87. Dhamdhere et al., supra note 82 (alteration in original).
88. See Taylor, supra note 47 (stating that the fewer networks separating
the customer and the part of the internet they are interacting with, the less
532 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 17:1
these voluntary, market-based agreements, providers
independently make decisions about interconnection by
weighing the benefits and costs on a case-by-case basis.89
Because [t]ransit between networks is one of the most
significant causes of delay and lost data, 90 parties will only
enter these agreements when they perceive mutual value in
doing so.91
One of the largest CDNs, Akamai, speaks to a few
scenarios where entering a paid peering agreement may be the
best option for the content ISP and the eyeball ISP.92 If the
content provider does not need access to all of the Internet, but
only to the cone of prefixes that belong to the eyeball network,
it may be better for the content ISP to enter into a paid peering
agreement.93 Also, if either or both eyeball and content ISPs
are paying third parties, the transit ISPs, for transit, then
cutting out the middleman and entering into direct network
connections with each other will be better off for both parties.94
i. The Netflix-Comcast Paid Peering Agreement
The Netflix-Comcast arrangement can help put all of these
components together.95 Large tech companies began
circumventing the complexities of the transit network and its
congestion issues by entering into paid peering agreements.
Prior to the Netflix-Comcast paid peering agreement, Netflix,
Cogent, and Comcast worked together to deliver content to the
end-user.96 Netflix was the content provider, Cogent was the
chance for delay and quality loss, especially if some of the networks dont
invest enough in performance, redundancy and capacity.).
89. 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 19, at 5992 (internal citation
omitted).
90. James B. Speta, A Common Carrier Approach to Internet
Interconnection, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 225, 232 (2002).
91. 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 19, at 5993 (internal citation
omitted).
92. See Peyman Faratin et al., The Growing Complexity of Internet
Interconnection, 72 COMM& STRATEGIES 51, 5960 (2008).
93. Id. at 60.
94. Id.
95. Cf. Russell, supra note 40 (discussing how the deal between Comcast
and Netflix will improve the Netflix streaming experience for end users).
96. See Seward, supra note 2 (Netflix . . . purchased transit from Cogent,
which had a settlement-free peering arrangement with Comcast.).
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transit ISP, and Comcast was the eyeball ISP.97 When Comcast
started experiencing content delivery at a drastically slower
rate than usual to its end-users, due to traffic congestion from
Netflix to Cogent and Cogent to Comcast, especially during
peak streaming video hours, Comcast slowed down the rate at
which Netflixs content was delivered to its end-users.98
Comcast subscribers went from viewing Netflix content at
720p on average HD quality to viewing content at nearly VHS
quality.99 Comcast then demanded more fees from Cogent and
Cogent in turn demanded fees from Comcast in order to
increase transit.100
Analogous to a highway, the eyeball ISP was charging the
transit ISP to increase the width of its highway for more lanes
to reduce traffic congestion. Comcast thought Cogent should
pay up like any other CDN because Netflix was making it bring
in more data than it was sending out.101 Here, Cogent was the
cause of congestion.102 As a result of these disputes, Netflix, in
97. See generally Ma et al., supra note 3 (discussing the characteristics of
and relationship between content providers, transit ISPs, and eyeball ISPs).
98. See Seward, supra note 2 (explaining how when Cogent started
providing transit service for Netflix, Comcast refused to continue to augment
capacity at [Cogents] interconnection points as it had done for years prior
[when the routes into Comcasts network would begin to congest].). This type
of last-mile throttling is what the No Throttling rule is aimed to prohibit.
See generally 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 19, at 5607 ¶ 16 (detailing
the No Throttling Rule and the reasons for its promulgation).
99. Seward, supra note 2 (alteration in original).
100. See Dan Rayburn, Heres How the Comcast & Netflix Deal Is
Structured, with Data & Numbers, STREAMING MEDIA BLOG (Feb. 27, 2014,
12:14 PM), http://blog.streamingmedia.com/2014/02/heres-comcast-netflix-
deal-structured-numbers.html (reporting that Comcast charged Cogent to be
able to add more capacity and giving reasons why Cogent would charge
Comcast).
101. Russell, supra note 40. See also Jim Cicconi, Who Should Pay for
Netflix?, AT&T PUBLIC POLICY BLOG (March 21, 2014, 4:08 P.M.),
http://www.attpublicpolicy.com/consumers-2/who-should-pay-for-netflix/
(criticizing Netflix and the argument against paid prioritization by arguing
that someone has to foot the bill for extra bandwidth) ([T]here is no free
lunch, and theres also no cost-free delivery of streaming movies. Someone has
to pay that cost.).
102. Cogent had a reputation for being oversubscribed. See Rayburn, supra
note 100 (This is very different from what Netflix was getting from Cogent
because Comcast is providing fully dedicated capacity, unlike sending it
through someone like Cogent where those connections are potentially
over-subscribed if a transit provider over-sells their capacity, which Cogent
has a history of doing.). And previously when Comcast experienced an
increased load from Cogent, Comcast would upgrade their networks to
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an effort to gain market edge, figured out a way to circumvent
the global transit route by avoiding partnership with the
transit ISPs and by instead entering into an agreement103
directly with the eyeball ISPa paid peering arrangement
with Comcast.104 In the Netflix-Comcast deal, Netflixs content
is being moved along a private connection and never reaches
the global Internet.105 What the Netflix-Comcast agreement
accommodate the increased traffic, but with Netflix going through Cogent, and
experiencing consistently high levels of congestion every day, Comcast refused
to upgrade and demanded that Netflix should either directly integrate with
Comcast for a fee or use a tier 1 service that required an access fee. Id. With
Cogent, Netflix wouldnt need an access fee, but with Comcast now, it did. See
Seward, supra note 2 (Shortly after Cogent began delivering Netflix traffic
requested by Comcast subscribers, Cogents routes into Comcasts network
started to congest. According to Cogents CEO, [f]or most of Cogents history
with Comcast . . . [as] Comcasts subscribers demanded more content from
Cogents customers, Comcast would add capacity to the interconnection points
with Cogent to handle that increased traffic. After Cogent began carrying
Netflix traffic, however, Comcast refused to continue to augment capacity at
our interconnection points as it had done for years prior.) (omission in
original).
103. Aaron Souppouris, The Fight for the Open Internet Isnt Over,
ENGADGET (Mar. 17, 2015, 2:00 PM), http://www.engadget.com/2015/03/17/fcc-
open-internet-order-analysis/ (As a result of those disputes, Netflix saw its
service slow before it struck interconnection deals with Comcast, Verizon,
Time Warner and AT&T to bypass third parties and connect directly to their
servers, ensuring a smooth service for its users. The Open Internet order does
not address these kinds of deals.).
104. See Nick Feamster, Why Your Netflix Traffic Is Slow, and Why the
Open Internet Order Wont (Necessarily) Make It Faster, FREEDOM TO TINKER
(Mar. 25, 2015), https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/feamster/why-your-netflix-
traffic-is-slow-and-why-the-open-internet-order-wont-necessarily-make-it-
faster/; Stenovec, supra note 1. (Rayburn explained that ISPs have only so
much capacity, and if a network doesnt have enough, the quality of whats
being deliveredin this case, Netflixwill suffer. But investing in network
infrastructure is expensive, so ISPs have to decide how much theyre willing to
spend to deliver a certain experience to their customers.); see also Russell,
supra note 40. Paid peering arrangements are also known as access fee
arrangements. FCC Review of ISP Slow-Downs Only a First Step, FREE PRESS
(June 13, 2014), http://www.freepress.net/press-release/106340/fcc-review-isp-
slow-downs-only-first-step (referring to the fees that eyeball ISPs charge to
content providers as access fees).
105. Crane & Misra, supra note 28. Netflix also created a paid peering
agreement with Verizon but Verizon did not set up their infrastructure on
time. See Joel Hruska, Verizon Caught Throttling Netflix Traffic Even After It
Pays for More Bandwidth, EXTREMETECH (July 20, 2014, 7:08 AM),
http://www.extremetech.com/computing/186576-verizon-caught-throttling-
netflix-traffic-even-after-its-pays-for-more-bandwidth (arguing that Netflixs
poor streaming quality after the Netflix-Verizon paid peering agreement
should be blamed on Verizon for failing to utilize its networks full capacity).
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created was a streamlined private connection between the
content ISP and the eyeball ISP by cutting out the middleman
transit ISP, Cogent.106
ii. The Positive Side Effect of Throttling: Netflix Open
Connect and the Development of More CDNs
Because of Netflixs experience with throttling, the
company made an incredible push for the development of its
own CDN, Open Connect, giving Netflix the ability to double as
the content ISP and the CDN.107 Content ISPs are continuing
to build out their own CDN networks . . . to better deliver
content to consumers and attain more control over [their
traffic] . . . . and [p]urpose-built CDNs like Open Connect
give[s] streaming video services greater control over the
performance and cost of content delivery.108 Due to the large
expenses required to develop CDNs,109 however, companies
that build and maintain their own CDNs are a minority.
Merely a few other technology giants including Facebook,
Google, and Microsoft currently operate their own CDNs and
have peering agreements with eyeball ISPs.110
106. See Crane & Misra, supra note 28 (What Netflix paid for in its deal
with Comcast was not a fast lane in the Internet, but a special arrangement
whereby Comcast connects directly to Netflixs servers to speed up content
delivery. It is important to note that this arrangement is not currently covered
under conventional net neutrality, which bans fast lanes over the Internet
backbone.). Netflix was able to directly send its content to Comcast because it
was operating as a content delivery network in addition to acting as a content
provider, through its system, Open Connect. See Netflix Open Connect
Content, NETFLIX, https://openconnect.itp.netflix.com/ (last visited Oct. 14,
2015). Open Connect provides private interconnection services, public peering,
and transit services, much like Level 3 or Cogent. See id.
107. See Seward, supra note 2 (The threat of new access fees being passed
through to Netflix were making third-party CDNs [content delivery networks]
a less certain option for Netflix and in early 2012, Netflix began to transition
its traffic off of CDNs and onto transit providers with settlement-free routes
into Comcasts network.).
108. Mark Hoelzel, Heres Why Netflix and Google Are Pouring Resources
into Their Own Content Distribution Networks, BUS. INSIDER (June 3, 2014,
3:25 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/netflix-and-google-are-building-out-
their-own-content-distribution-networks-2014-6.
109. See Wetzel, supra note 65 (describing the expenses associated with
CDNs).
110. See Dan Rayburn, Latest List of Vendors in the Content Delivery
Ecosystem, STREAMING MEDIA BLOG (July 30, 2014, 1:52 PM),
http://blog.streamingmedia.com/2014/07/cdnvendors.html.
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C. THE COMMISSION IN THE COURTS
In June 2000, courts first addressed the issue of classifying
BIAS as a telecommunications service.111 The Ninth Circuit
held that cable modem service is a telecommunications service
to the extent that the cable operator provides its subscribers
Internet transmission over its cable broadband facility, and an
information service to the extent the operator acts as a
conventional ISP.112 In 2002, the Commission classified cable
modem services as an information service under Title I,
instead of a telecommunications service under Title II.113 The
Commission thought the ultimate resolution of this item
would promote broadband deployment, which should result in
better quality, lower prices and more choices for consumers.114
In 2005, however, the U.S. Supreme Court, in National
Cable & Telecommunications Assn v. Brand X Internet
Services, reversed the Ninth Circuits decision and upheld the
Commissions interpretation of broadband.115 Brand X was an
eyeball ISP that attempted to reclassify broadband as a
telecommunication service.116 The Supreme Court found that
the Commission had the authority to interpret the meaning of
what an ISP offers . . . with regard to the statutes term
telecommunications services under the Chevron doctrine,117
111. See AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 880 (9th Cir. 2000)
([t]he transmission of Internet service to subscribers over cable broadband
facilities is a telecommunications service under the Communications Act).
112. 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 19, at 5738 ¶ 316 (citing City of
Portland).
113. See Press Release, FCC Classifies Cable Modem Service as
Information Service, FED. COMMCNS COMMN (Mar. 14, 2002),
http://transition.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Cable/News_Releases/2002/nrcb0201.html.
114. Id. Many academics and commentators say that this was misplaced
and that this is probably where the Commission went wrong. See Greeley,
supra note 18 (If the FCC actually wants to ensure net neutrality, . . . [it] has
to unmake the mistake it made in 2002, when it failed to classify cable
Internet providers as telecommunications services.).
115. See also Natl Cable & Telecomms. Assn et al. v. Brand X Internet
Servs. et al., 545 U.S. 967, 967 (2005); 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note
19, at 5740 ¶ 322.
116. See Jennifer Wong, Net Neutrality: Preparing for the Future, 31 J.
NATL ASSN ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 669, 686 (2011) (Brand X, an ISP, wanted
the FCC to reclassify broadband as a telecommunication service in order to
apply common carrier obligations to private cable companies.).
117. See id. at 687 n.82 (citing Note, How Chevron Step One Limits
Permissible Agency Interpretations: Brand X and the FCCs Broadband
Reclassification, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1016, 1023 (2011) (The Chevron analysis
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and because it found the Commissions definition reasonable, it
denied Brand Xs request to reclassify BIAS as a common
carrier.118 It was also around this time that the term network
neutrality was coined in an effort to raise awareness around
the issue of why open access on the Internet is essential for
promotion of fair competition.119 Following this decision, the
Commission found itself in court twice facing claims from
eyeball ISPs, declaring that its regulation of their services was
legally unauthorized.
1. Round One: Comcast Corp. v. F.C.C.120
In 2007, Comcast subscribers noticed degraded video
quality and download speed on heavy content websites like
BitTorrent.121 Free Press and Public Knowledge, two non-profit
in reviewing an agencys interpretation of a statute includes two steps: 1) the
court employs traditional tools of statutory construction to determine
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue, and 2)
[i]f Congress has done so, then the inquiry ends and Congresss prescription
prevails. If, however, the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, then the court asks at Chevron step two whether the agencys
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.)).
118. See id. at 687.
119. Net neutrality is a term coined by Professor Tim Wu. See generally
Wu, supra note 14 (discussing what a network neutrality regime would look
like and why it should be adopted to promote fair competition). (Net
Neutrality means an Internet that enables and protects free speech. It means
that Internet service providers should provide us with open networksand
should not block or discriminate against any applications or content that ride
over those networks. Just as your phone company cannot decide who you could
call and what you say on that call, your ISP should not be concerned with
what content you view or post online.). The case that stimulated the
development of the concept of network neutrality was a 2005 case involving an
ISP that attempted to utilize existing cable wires in order to compete against
existing cable companies. See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 967 (upholding the FCCs
characterization of the Internet as an information service instead of a
telecommunications service and holding that cable companies were
prohibited from using existing cable wires in order to function as a competing
Internet Service Provider).
120. See Comcast Corp. v. F.C.C., 600 F.3d 642, 644 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
121. See Comcast Corp. v. F.C.C., 600 F.3d at 644; Peter Svensson,
Comcast Blocks Some Internet Traffic, WASH. POST (Oct. 19, 2007, 6:32 PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/19
/AR2007101900842.html; see also Wong, supra note 116, at 688 (citing
Christopher R. Steffe, Comment, Why We Need Net Neutrality Legislation Now
or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Trust the FCC, 58 DRAKE L. REV.
1149, 116263 (2010) (The Associated Press launched its own
investigation . . . and found that there were unusual difficulties during
legitimate transfers of the King James Bible over BitTorrent.).
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organizations focused on an open Internet, filed a complaint to
the Commission, alleging that Comcast was discriminating
against certain types of Internet traffic.122 Comcast was
ultimately decreed to cease such behavior in In the Matters of
Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against
Comcast Corporation (Comcast Order) issued by the
Commission.123 In its Order, the Commission documented
Comcasts discriminatory behavior, prohibited the eyeball ISP
from discriminating against certain types of web traffic, and
implemented certain mandatory disclosure requirements to
ensure that Comcast was complying with its new agreed upon
system for managing bandwidth demand.124 As a result of the
Comcast Order, Comcast brought suit against the Commission,
Comcast Corp v. F.C.C.125 The D.C. Circuit, despite
122. See Formal Complaint at 35, Free Press & Public Knowledge v.
Comcast Corp. (F.C.C. 2007), https://www.publicknowledge.org
/pdf/fp_pk_comcast_complaint.pdf (alleging that Comcast had violated the
FCCs Internet Policy Statement regarding regulation of video-on-demand
service).
123. See In the Matters of Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public
Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer
Applications and Broadband Industry Practices Petition of Free Press et al. for
Declaratory Ruling that Degrading an Internet Application Violates the FCCs
Internet Policy Statement and Does Not Meet an Exception for Reasonable
Network Management, 23 FCC Rcd.13028 (adopted Aug. 1, 2008),
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-08-183A1.pdf; see also
Press Release, Commission Orders Comcast to End Discriminatory Network
Management Practices, FED. COMMCNS COMMN (Aug. 1, 2008),
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-284286A1.pdf (Under the
plan, within 30 days of release of the Order Comcast must: Disclose the details
of its discriminatory network management practices to the Commission;
Submit a compliance plan describing how it intends to stop these
discriminatory management practices by the end of the year; Disclose to
customers and the Commission the network management practices that will
replace current practices. To the extent that Comcast fails to comply with the
steps set forth in the Order, interim injunctive relief automatically will take
effect requiring Comcast to suspend its discriminatory network management
practices and the matter will be set for hearing.).
124. See id. (Because by then Comcast had agreed to adopt a new system
for managing bandwidth demand, the Commission simply ordered it to make a
set of disclosures describing the details of its new approach and the companys
progress toward implementing it . . . . The Commission added that an
injunction would automatically issue should Comcast either fail to make the
required disclosures or renege on its commitment.) (citing In the Matters of
Formal Complaint of Free Press & Pub. Knowledge Against Comcast Corp., 23
F.C.C. Rcd. 13028, 13,05960, ¶¶ 5455 (2008) [hereinafter Comcast Order]).
125. See Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 64656 (holding that the FCC did not
have ancillary jurisdiction over petitioner Comcasts service to regulate peer-
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acknowledging the Commissions rationale behind the
disclosure requirements in its Order126 held against the
Commission and vacated the Comcast Order on the grounds
that the Commission did not have jurisdiction to regulate peer-
to-peer networking applications.127 Because the Commission
had failed to support its argument with a legal rationale that
would permit it to subject broadband providers to common
carriage regulation, the Commission was left unable to regulate
Comcasts network practices.128 In addition to Comcast and
Brand X, due to disputes with other eyeball ISPs, the
Commission began to create a set of rules to enforce and
maintain this concept of net neutrality.129
2. The 2010 Open Internet Order: Broadband Internet Access
Service Classified As an Information Service Under Title I
In the 2010 Open Internet Order,130 the Commission drew
on a variety of cable, broadcast, interconnection, wireless, and
deregulation provisions of the Communications Act to tether its
claim to Title I ancillary authority over the Internet.131 These
to-peer networking applications); see alsoWong, supra note 116, at 685 ([T]he
D.C. Circuit held that the FCC did not have regulatory or ancillary authority
over Comcasts unreasonable network management practices because it failed
to tie that authority to any express statutory delegation by Congress.) (citing
Susan Crawford, Ancillary jurisdiction has to be ancillary to something,
SUSAN CRAWFORD (Apr. 6, 2010), http://scrawford.net/ancillary-jurisdiction-
has-to-be-ancillary-to-something/).
126. See Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 644.
127. See id.
128. See id.; see also Wong, supra note 116, at 690 (The FCC claimed
several sections of the Communications Act of 1934 delegated to them
regulatory authority over ISP network management practices, but the Court
ultimately struck down all of the FCCs arguments . . . . The Court held that
the FCC relied on statements of policy that do not, by themselves, create
statutorily mandated responsibilities.) (citing Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at
644).
129. The FCC, in 2005, fined North Carolina based Internet Service
Provider, Madison River Communications, for preventing its subscribers from
using a Voice over Internet Provider (VoIP) service that competed with its own
voice calling service. See Anthony Ortega, Vonage Wins FCC Case to Stop VoIP
Call Blocking, TOOLBOX.COM (Apr. 4, 2014), http://it.toolbox.com/blogs/voip-
news/vonage-wins-fcc-case-to-stop-voip-call-blocking-59704.
130. 2010 Open Internet Order, supra note 6.
131. See Wong, supra note 116, at 692 (citing Paul Glist, FCC Adopts Net
Neutrality Rules; Relies on Title I Ancillary Jurisdiction, BROADBAND L.
ADVISOR (Dec. 21, 2010), http://www.broadbandlawadvisor.com
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rules included a no blocking, no unreasonable discrimination
rule and stated that eyeball ISPs were required to provide more
transparency in terms of network management practices,
performance, and commercial terms of their [BIAS] to
consumers.132 The no-blocking principle states that ISPs
cannot block lawful content, applications, services, or non-
harmful devices, subject to reasonable network
management.133 The unreasonable discrimination rule
prohibited ISPs from unreasonably discriminating in
transmitting lawful network traffic over a consumers BIAS.134
Also, for the first time, the 2010 Open Internet Order defined
BIAS.135
A [BIAS is a] mass-market retail service by wire or radio that
provides the capability to transmit data to and receive data from all
or substantially all Internet endpoints, including any capabilities
that are incidental to and enable the operation of the
communications service, but excluding dial-up Internet access
service. This term also encompasses any service that the
Commission finds to be providing a functional equivalent of the
service described in the previous sentence, or that is used to evade
the protections set forth in this Part.136
In theory, the 2010 Open Internet Order was established to
enforce the concept of net neutrality and to give all Internet
end-users equal access to websites and applications without
discrimination from their service providers.137
/2010/12/articles/accessibility-persons-with-disabilities/fcc-adopts-net-
neutrality-rules-relies-on-title-i-ancillary-jurisdiction/).
132. Id. at 69293 (internal citation omitted).
133. Id. at 693. See also 2010 Open Internet Order, supra note 6, at 17992.
134. 2010 Open Internet Order, supra note 6, at 17992. See also Wong,
supra note 116, at 693.
135. See 2010 Open Internet Order, supra note 6, at 17932.
136. The Commission recently confirmed that the definition of BIAS would
stay the same. See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 19, at 5682 ¶ 187
(citing 47 C.F.R. § 8.11(a); 2010 Open Internet Order, supra note 6, at 17932).
137. See 2010 Open Internet Order, supra note 6, at 17906 ¶ 1. For
example, on January 16, 2013, AT&T ended its blocking of FaceTime after
facing insurmountable pressure from public interest groups administering the
Commissions 2010 Open Internet Order. See Jenn Ettinger, AT&T Will Allow
FaceTime on Some Data Plans, Still Blocking Unlimited, FREE PRESS (Jan. 16,
2013), http://www.freepress.net/press-release/101707/att-will-allow-facetime-
some-data-plans-still-blocking-unlimited; see also David Kravets, Net
Neutrality Groups Challenge AT&T FaceTime Blocking, WIRED (Sept. 18,
2012, 5:03 PM), http://www.wired.com/2012/09/factime-fcc-flap/; Adi
Robertson, AT&T Says Any Mobile Video Chat App Will Work on Its Network
by the End of 2013, VERGE (May 20, 2013, 2:12 PM), http://www.theverge.com
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3. Round Two: Verizon v. F.C.C.138
In 2011, Verizon appealed the 2010 Open Internet Order
rules to the D.C. Circuit and challenged the Commissions
authority to impose these rules.139 Verizon argued that the
Commissions rules were hindering its ability to explore
commercial arrangements with edge providers, which
essentially would charge end-users differently based on
Internet usage.140 The Commission justified its position in
instilling these open Internet rules by contending that its goal
was to foster innovation and the growth of the Internet.141
The Commission also argued that Section 706 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996142 gave the Commission the
authority to promulgate these rules.143 The D.C. Circuit
ultimately rejected the Commissions arguments and held that,
while the Commission does have rulemaking authority, Section
706 of the Telecommunications Act did not allow the
Commission to explicitly exempt broadband providers from
being treated as a common carrier.144
On January 14, 2014, because the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals found that the Commission did not have the authority
to circumvent express statutory requirements, it vacated parts
of the Order.145 [T]he Verizon court went on to explain that
/2013/5/20/4348672/att-will-allow-all-video-chat-apps-on-its-network-by-end-
of-2013.
138. See Verizon v. F.C.C., 740 F.3d 623, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
139. Id.
140. Verizon conceded, during oral arguments, that the FCCs Open
Internet rules were the only thing preventing it from charging its subscribers
for website usage. Oral Argument at 29:15, Verizon v. F.C.C., 740 F.3d 623
(2014) (No. 12-1305), http://www.c-span.org/video/?314904-1/verizon-v-federal-
communications-commission-oral-argument (But for these rules, we would be
exploring those commercial arrangements, but this order prohibits
those . . . .).
141. Id. See also 2010 Open Internet Order, supra note 6, at 17906 ¶ 1.
142. Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 706, 110 Stat. 56, 153 (1996).
143. See Verizon, 740 F.3d at 628.
144. See id. at 628; see also NCTA, supra note 9 ([C]ommon carriers are
private companies that sell their services to everyone on the same terms,
rather than companies that make more individualized decisions about who to
serve and what to charge.).
145. See Verizon, 740 F.3d at 628 (holding that the FCC did not have
authority to regulate broadband providers as a telecommunications service
under Title II of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 because the FCC had
previously determined that Internet broadband services were information
services not subject to common carrier obligations).
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broadband providers furnish a service to edge providers, thus
undoubtedly functioning as edge providers carriers, and held
that the 2010 no-blocking and no-unreasonable discrimination
rules impermissibly obligated [broadband providers] to act as
common carriers.146 The Verizon court vacated parts of the
2010 Open Internet Order and held a decision that overturned
the Commissions implementation of net neutrality.147
Additionally, the decision struck down the portions of the
Order that enforced anti-discriminatory behavior and anti-
blocking behavior from eyeball ISPs to edge providers.148 These
portions of the Order were rules that were put in place to
maintain network neutrality.149
Following the removal of anti-blocking and anti-
discrimination rules, ISPs were then able to discriminate and
block content based on the end-users web usage.150 This
decision essentially gave ISPs, like Verizon and Comcast, the
authority to create paid prioritization, or tiered pricing,
structures for online traffic based on usage.151 Numerous
companies attempted to convey that the Internet would
146. 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 19, at 5733 ¶ 306.
147. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 659 (rejecting Verizons challenge to the Open
Internet Orders disclosure rules, but vacating both the anti-discrimination
and the anti-blocking rules).
148. Id.
149. See id.; see also 2014 Open Internet NPRM, supra note 16, at 5563 ¶ 6
(In its 2010 Order, the Commission found that providers of broadband
Internet access service had three types of incentives to limit Internet
openness.). Media outlets dubbed this decision as an attack on net neutrality.
But see Dennis L. Weisman, Did the High Court Reach an Economic Low in
Verizon v. FCC?, 1 REV. OF NETWORK ECON. 90, 90103 (2002) (discussing the
Supreme Courts decision in Verizon v. FCC and how the High Court came to
its decision on two erroneous interpretations of the Telecommunications Act).
Weisman also discusses why the FCCs regulations undermine the goals of the
Act. See id. at 90.
150. See Sam Gustin, Net Neutrality Ruling Paves the Way for Internet
Fast Lanes, TIME.COM (Jan. 15, 2014), http://business.time.com/2014/01/15
/net-neutrality-ruling-paves-the-way-for-internet-fast-lanes/.
151. See id. Some ISPs have already started to create pricing structures for
exemption of certain limits on services. For example, AT&T traditionally
imposed a data cap on its customers. In January 2014, however, it imposed a
new policy allowing edge providers the ability to pay for an exemption from its
data cap in order to continue providing their services to customers as long as
the fee was paid. See Jon Brodkin, AT&T Turns Data Caps into Profits with
New Fees for Content Providers, ARSTECHNICA (Jan. 6, 2014, 12:24 PM),
http://arstechnica.com/business/2014/01/att-turns-data-caps-into-profits-with-
new-fees-for-content-providers/.
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function significantly slower if regulators created tiered price
structures that ultimately allowed broadband providers the
ability to utilize content at another providers expense.152
Discussions about the potential negative impact of the Verizon
ruling were widely published on various news outlets,
magazines, journals, and blogs.153
Although the Verizon Court seemingly stripped the
Commission of its authority to implement net neutrality, it did
not rule that the Commission was unable to enforce rules on
ISPs completely.154 It instead implied that if the Commission
wanted to create certain regulations to maintain an open
Internet, it must do so by treating broadband carriers similarly
to a telecommunications service;155 a carrier treated as an
information service under Title I of the Telecommunications
Act gives the agency light regulatory power over its actions and
pricing, while a telecommunications service under Title II
common carrier of the Act provides the agency with wide
regulatory power,156 thus, foreshadowing the next
Commissions next move.
D. THE 2015 OPEN INTERNET ORDER
When the Commission first addressed the D.C. Circuits
holding in Comcast, former Chairman Commissioner Julius
152. See Gautham Nagesh, Websites to Protest Net Neutrality Plan, WALL
ST. J. (Sept. 9, 2014 7:49 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/websites-plan-
online-protest-backing-net-neutrality-wednesday-1410298792. Online
companies and advocacy groups have planned to protest against the new
Commission rules by setting up a spinning-wheel icon on their websites. Id.
153. Non-profit institutions such as Free Press, Fight for the Future, and
Demand Progress have geared up to protest against Tom Wheeler and the
Commissions proposed rules for how broadband providers can treat content
traveling through their networks. Id.
154. See Verizon v. F.C.C., 740 F.3d 623, 62324 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
155. See id.
156. See id. at 650; see also Brendan Greeley, Solving the Net Neutrality
Problem Is Actually Simple, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Jan. 17, 2014),
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-01-17/solving-the-net-neutrality-
problem-is-actually-very-very-simple (arguing that if the Commission
reclassifies broadband providers under Title II common carrier as a
telecommunications service, it will be automatically regulated as a common
carrierit cannot discriminate among the kinds of traffic that pass through
it).
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Genachowski laid out three possible options.157 The first was to
continue relying on Title Is ancillary authority, the second
option was for the Commission to reclassify the Internet as a
telecommunications service, so that the Commission could have
authority to regulate BIAS under Title II, and the third way
that Chairman Commissioner Genachowski laid out was to
reclassify BIAS as a telecommunications service with broad
forbearance to a majority of the provisions in the Act.158 His
proposal sought to apply only a handful of provisions of Title II
(Sections 201, 202, 208, 222, 254, and 255) to BIAS.159
On May 14, 2014, the Commission released its second
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking following the 2010 Open
Internet Order and two court battles.160 The Commission made
the 2014 Open Internet NPRM available for public comment,
collecting over 3.7 million submissions during the unrestricted
four-month period it held open for comment submission.161 On
November 10, 2014, even President Obama issued an official
statement endorsing net neutrality.162 The Presidents
statement urged the Commission to implement no blocking and
no throttling rules, with increased transparency and a ban on
paid prioritization.163 Further, he urged the Commission to
reclassify broadband services under Title II common carrier as
157. See Julius Genachowski, The Third Way: A Narrowly Tailored
Broadband Framework, FCC.GOV (May 6, 2010),
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-297944A1.pdf.
158. Id. See generally Edward Wyatt, F.C.C. Chairman Says Agency Will
Not Rush Net Neutrality Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2014, 2:33 PM),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/11/21/f-c-c-chairman-says-agency-will-not-
rush-net-neutrality-rules/ (The big dogs are going to sue regardless of what
comes out, the chairman, Tom Wheeler, told reporters after the F.C.C.s
monthly public meeting. We need to make sure we have sustainable rules and
that starts with making sure that we have addressed the multiplicity of issues
that come along.).
159. Genachowski, supra note 157.
160. See 2014 Open Internet NPRM, supra note 16.
161. This number exceeded any comments section the Commission had
hosted before. See Jacob Kastrenakes, FCC Received a Total of 3.7 Million
Comments on Net Neutrality, VERGE (Sept. 16, 2014, 6:06 PM),
http://www.theverge.com/2014/9/16/6257887/fcc-net-neutrality-3-7-million-
comments-made; see also LastWeekTonight, Last Week Tonight with John
Oliver: Net Neutrality (HBO), YOUTUBE (June 1, 2014),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fpbOEoRrHyU.
162. See Office of the Press Secy, supra note 18.
163. See id.
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a telecommunications service.164 Finally, after reviewing the
comments, seeking advice from numerous entities, and hearing
the White Houses stance on the issue, the Commission, in a 3-
2 vote, decided to adopt rules reclassifying BIAS as a
telecommunications service.165 The Commission, therefore,
granted itself the authority to regulate BIAS under Title II and
assigned three bright-line rules to BIAS with broad
forbearance. This resulted in, as most consumers had hoped
for, an upholding of net neutrality.166
1. Reclassification of BIAS as Telecommunication Services
Under Section 706 and Title II Common Carrier Authority
In the 2015 Open Internet Order, the Commission,
reclassified BIAS as a telecommunications service under its
Section 706, Title II, and Title III authority of the
Communications Act.167 Section 706 affords the Commission
affirmative legal authority to adopt all of todays open Internet
rules.168 The Commission also applied Sections 201, 202, and
208 of Title II to provide alternative sources of authority for
164. Id. (If a consumer requests access to a website or service, and the
content is legal, your ISP should not be permitted to block it . . . . Nor should
ISPs be able to intentionally slow down some content or speed up others
through a process often called throttlingbased on the type of service or your
ISPs preferences . . . . I am also asking the FCC to make full use of the
transparency authorities the court recently upheld . . . . No service should be
stuck in a slow lane because it does not pay a fee. That kind of gatekeeping
would undermine the level playing field essential to the Internets growth. So,
as I have before, I am asking for an explicit ban on paid prioritization and any
other restriction that has a similar effect.).
165. Chairman of the Commission Tom Wheeler, Commissioner Mignon L.
Clyburn, and Commissioner Jessica Rosenworcel casted votes in favor of the
revised rules. Dissenting Commissioners Ajut Pai and Michael ORielly stated
that the government should not have control of the free and open economy. See
Bill Chappell, FCC Approves Net Neutrality Rules for Open Internet, NPR
(Feb. 26, 2015, 11:46 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-
way/2015/02/26/389259382/net-neutrality-up-for-vote-today-by-fcc-board (The
dissenting votes came from Michael ORielly and Ajut Pai, Republicans who
warned that the FCC was overstepping its authority and interfering in
commerce to solve a problem that doesnt exist. They also complained that the
measures 300-plus pages werent publicly released or openly debated.).
166. See Open Internet, FED. COMMCNS COMMN, http://www.fcc.gov
/openinternet (last visited Nov. 4, 2015).
167. See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 19, at 5682 ¶ 187.
168. Id. at 5721 ¶ 275.
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these bright-line rules.169 [T]he rules we adopt today are also
supported by our legal authority under Title II to regulate
telecommunications services . . . . [W]e conclude that retail
broadband Internet access services is best understood today as
an offering of a telecommunications service.170 This
classification was what the court in Brand X had referred to
when it stated that the Commission could have the authority to
regulate BIAS.171 The Commission, however, refrained from
reclassifying cable broadband.172 As the record
reflects, . . . broadband providers are offering both consumers
and edge providers straightforward transmission capabilities
that the Communications Act defines as a telecommunications
service.173 Title III was utilized to provide additional
authority for mobile broadband Internet access services.174
Reclassifying BIAS as telecommunication services under
Title II gave the Commission authority to regulate actions of
last-mile providers with its bright-line rules because BIAS is
now regulated under common carrier and public utility
provisions.175 Section 202 of Title II makes it unlawful for any
common carrier to make any unjust or unreasonable
discrimination in charges, practices, classifications,
169. Id. at 572425 ¶¶ 28384 (describing how the sections grant the
Commission the authority to regulate BIAS with bright-line rules[S]ection
201(a) places a duty on common carriers to furnish communications services
subject to Title II [with exceptions] . . . . Section 201(b) . . . gives the
Commission the authority to prescribe such rules and regulations as may be
necessary in the public interest . . . .).
170. Id. at 5724 ¶ 283; 5734 ¶ 308.
171. See id. at 5614 ¶ 43 ([T]he Brand X Court explicitly acknowledged
that the Commission had previously classified the transmission service, which
broadband providers offer, as a telecommunications service and that the
Commission could return to that classification if it provided an adequate
justification.) (alteration in original).
172. See id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 5725 ¶ 285 (With respect to mobile broadband Internet access
services, todays open Internet rules are further supported by our authority
under Title III of the Act . . . .).
175. See id. at 5915 (The Open Internet Order reclassifies broadband
Internet access as a telecommunications service under Title II of the
Communications Act while simultaneously foregoing utility-style, burdensome
regulation that would harm investment.); see also Chappell, supra note 165
(After [Verizon], the FCC looked at ways to reclassify broadband to gain
broader regulatory powers. It will now treat Internet service providers as
carriers under Title II of the Telecommunications Act, which regulates
services as public utilities.).
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regulations, facilities, or services for or in connection with like
communication services, . . . to make or give any undue or
unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person,
class of person, or locality . . . .176 The Commission, under its
authority also adopted three bright-line rules banning
blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization, and clarified the
no-unreasonable interference/disadvantage standard by which
the Commission will evaluate other practices in the future.177
The Commission however, asserted that it would be applying a
light touch regulatory framework by forbearing from applying
a majority of Title IIs provisions.178
2. A Light- Touch Regulatory FrameworkThree Bright-
Line Rules and Broad Forbearance
The 2015 Open Internet Order bright-line rules include the
following:
No Blocking. A person engaged in the provision of broadband
Internet access service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall
not block lawful content, applications, services, or non-harmful
devices, subject to reasonable network management.179
The Commission prohibits last-mile broadband providers,
eyeball ISPs, from blocking any content merely due to heavy
traffic congestion or any similar unreasonable network
practice.180 For example, this rule prohibits Comcast from
blocking BitTorrents content because it is taking up a majority
of the available bandwidth and thus slowing down content
delivery from other content ISPs to end-users.
No Throttling. A person engaged in the provision of broadband
Internet access service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall
not impair or degrade lawful Internet traffic on the basis of Internet
content, application, or service, or use of a non-harmful device,
subject to reasonable network management.181
176. See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 19, at 572425 ¶ 284.
177. Id. at 5618 ¶ 59.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 5607 ¶ 15.
180. See id.; see also id. at 5611 ¶ 32 (Reasonable network
management . . . is a practice that has a primarily technical network
management justification, but does not include other business practices. A
network management practice is reasonable if it is primarily used for and
tailored to achieving a legitimate network management purpose, taking into
account the particular network architecture and technology of the broadband
Internet access service.).
181. Id. at 5607 ¶ 16.
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The no throttling rule prohibits broadband
providers/eyeball ISPs from manually slowing down or
impairing content from being delivered to end-users at its
normal rate due to its level of content, application, or service.182
For example, Comcast cannot slow down streaming content
from Netflix merely due to its high level of traffic during peak
hours.
No Paid Prioritization. A person engaged in the provision of
broadband Internet access service, insofar as such person is so
engaged, shall not engage in paid prioritization. Paid prioritization
refers to the management of a broadband providers network to
directly or indirectly favor some traffic over other traffic, including
through use of techniques such as traffic shaping, prioritization,
resource reservation, or other forms of preferential traffic
management, either (a) in exchange for consideration (monetary or
otherwise) from a third party, or (b) to benefit an affiliated entity.183
The third rule prohibits eyeball ISPs from utilizing paid
prioritization schemes to incentivize content ISPs to have its
content delivered at higher speeds or quality.184 This goes hand
in hand with the throttling and blocking rules, in that eyeball
ISPs cannot utilize its oligarchic power to receive benefits
(monetary or otherwise).185 This rule does not have the
reasonable network management factor because it is by
definition, [] not a means of managing a network, but is the
end result from eyeball ISPs network management
practices.186 Hence, because paid prioritization could occur from
blocking or throttling network practices, this rule is subject
to reasonable standards.
Essentially, the no blocking policy prohibits eyeball ISPs
from refusing to enter into contracts with content providers in
order to block such ISPs from offering services to end-users in
the eyeball ISPs territory.187 The no throttling clause
prohibits eyeball ISPs from slowing down speeds at which
content ISPs are driving their traffic to end-users.188 In its no
paid prioritization provision, the Commission prohibits eyeball
182. Id.
183. Id. at 560708 ¶ 18.
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. Id. at 5611 ¶ 32.
187. See id. at 5607 ¶ 15.
188. See id. at 5607 ¶¶ 1617.
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ISPs from charging content ISPs an increased rate for
providing content to end-users for the last mile.189
Moreover, in reclassifying fixed and mobile broadband
Internet access services as telecommunications services, the
Commission defined broadband Internet access services as the
exchange of Internet traffic by an edge provider [also known as
a content ISP] or an intermediary with the broadband
providers network.190 This meant that the Commission would
apply these rules to all connections as long as they were
maintained within the global transit network.191 These rules
could essentially end the dispute on net neutrality, prohibiting
all eyeball ISPs from utilizing oligarchic power to increase
profits; profits that may ultimately be passed on to the end-
user.192
The Commission explicitly stated that it would forbear
from a majority of provisions of Title II common carrier
classification, including the provision pertaining to peering
arrangements.193 The 2015 Open Internet Order set out a
three-part test that the Commission conducted in order to
determine whether forbearance was necessary.194
3. The Three-Part Forbearance Test
The three-part test states that:
The Commission shall forbear from applying new regulation or
provision of the Communications Act to telecommunications carriers
or telecommunications services if the Commission determines that:
(1) enforcement of such regulation or provision is not necessary to
ensure that the charges, practices, classifications, or regulations by,
for, or in connection with that telecommunications carrier or
189. See id. at 560708 ¶ 18.
190. Id. at 5686 ¶ 195.
191. See id. for global transit network definition. See generally Antonio J.
Jara, Trust Extension Protocol for Authentication in Networks Oriented to
Management (TEPANOM), in AVAILABILITY, RELIABILITY, AND SECURITY IN
INFORMATION SYSTEMS 155, 158 (Stephanie Teufel et al. eds, 2014) (defining
global transit network as a collection of networks and physical routers which
interconnect the public organizations, research centers, and end users through
Internet Service Providers around the entire world).
192. See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 19, at 560708 ¶ 18.
193. See id. at 568687 ¶ 195 ([The FCC] conclude[s] that, at this time,
application of the no-unreasonable interference/disadvantage standard and
the prohibition on blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization to the Internet
traffic exchange arrangements is not warranted.).
194. See id. at 5805 ¶ 435.
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telecommunications service are just and reasonable and are not
unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory; (2) enforcement of such
regulation or provision is not necessary for the protection of
consumers; and (3) forbearance from applying such provision or
regulation is consistent with the public interest.195
The D.C. Circuit concluded that the Commissions
interpretation of necessary was accurate in that it referred to
the existence of a strong connection between what the agency
has done by way of regulation and what the agency permissibly
sought to achieve with the disputed regulation.196 In addition
to the three bright-line rules, the Commission also states its
authority to regulate gatekeeper power by establishing a
standard that prevents gatekeepersnamely broadband
providers, or eyeball ISPsfrom exercising practices that are
unreasonably interfering or unreasonably disadvantaging
consumers or edge providers.197 Although the Commission
used its authority to regulate last-mile providers of BIAS, it
acknowledged that it would be applying a light touch
regulatory framework under Title II.198 It exercised broad
forbearance to over 700 rules.199
The Chairman of the Commission, Tom Wheeler stated,
Todays proposal is all about what happens on the broadband
providers network and how the consumers connection to the
Internet may not be interfered with or otherwise
compromised.200 Commissioner Mignon L. Clyburn, in her
official statement, disclosed that she wanted to originally go in
a different direction with the new rules that would, in addition
to the rules set forth in the 2015 Open Internet Order,
prevent[] the specialized services exemption from becoming a
loophole.201 Because the Order commits to monitor Internet
195. Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 160(a)).
196. Id. at 5805 ¶ 436. See also Cellular Telecomms. & Internet Assn v.
FCC, 330 F.3d 502, 512 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (evaluating the Commissions
interpretation of Section 10(a)(2) of Title II under Chevron step two).
197. 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 19, at 560809 ¶¶ 2022.
198. Id. at 5612 ¶ 37 (Today, our forbearance approach results in over 700
codified rules being inapplicable, a light-touch approach for the use of Title II.
This includes no unbundling of last-mile facilities, no tariffing, no rate
regulation, and no cost accounting rules . . . .).
199. See id. at 561618 ¶¶ 5159 (explaining provisions with applicable
broad forbearance).
200. Id. at 5948.
201. Id. at 5916 (I preferred a different path than the one the Commission
ultimately adopted. Specifically, I preferred: (1) Title II with forbearance, (2)
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traffic exchange arrangements, and enables the FCC to
intervene, if appropriate, however, Commissioner Clyburn
acknowledged that this Order [struck] the right balance and
got it right on its third bite at the apple.202
II. ANALYSIS
When the Commission adopted the 2014 Open Internet
NPRM, it considered regulating Internet traffic exchange
agreements, which include interconnection.203 The 2015 Open
Internet Order, however, refrained from enforcing Section
251,204 which would allow the Commission to authoritatively
enforce and regulate Internet traffic exchange and
interconnection practices, like paid peering.205 It also forebore
from enforcing Sections 25556,206 which lay out the standards
and guidelines with which interconnection arrangements must
comply. 207 When adopting the 2014 Open Internet NPRM,
Chairman Commissioner Wheeler issued a separate written
statement acknowledging that interconnection was an issue,
but that regulation of it was to be addressed at another time.208
mobile parity, (3) a ban on paid prioritization, and (4) preventing the
specialized services exemption from becoming a loophole.).
202. Id. at 5916, 5918.
203. See Praveen Goyal, U.S. FCC Chairman Announces Title II Net
Neutrality Proposal, HLREGULATION (Feb. 18, 2015), http://www
.hlregulation.com/2015/02/18/u-s-fcc-chairman-announces-title-ii-net-
neutrality-proposal/ (Interconnection. Under the proposed rules, the FCC
would have authority to take enforcement action based on complaints that
ISPs interconnection practices are not just and reasonable. This would
permit the FCC to intervene in disputes relating to paid peering, for
example.).
204. 47 U.S.C. § 251 (2012) (Interconnection. (a) General Duty of
Telecommunications Carriers.Each telecommunications carrier has the
duty(1) to interconnect directly or indirectly with the facilities and
equipment of other telecommunications carriers; and (2) not to install network
features, functions, or capabilities that do not comply with the guidelines and
standards established pursuant to section 255 or 256 of this title.).
205. 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 19, at 568687 ¶ 195 ([W]e
conclude that, at this time, application of the no-unreasonable
interference/disadvantage standard and the prohibitions on blocking,
throttling, and paid prioritization to the Internet traffic exchange
arrangements is not warranted.).
206. 47 U.S.C. §§ 25556.
207. 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 19, at 568687 ¶ 195.
208. Id. at 5686 n. 482 ([T]he question of interconnection (peering)
between the consumers network provider and the various networks that
deliver to that ISP . . . is a different matter that is better addressed
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This section will analyze the problems that could arise from
forbearing from interconnection regulation, and how the
Commission can bring clarity to its Order, but why, ultimately,
the Commission may have struck the right balance by
maintaining a light touch regulatory approach to properly
address the hotly contested net neutrality issue.
A. FORBEARANCE TO SECTION 251 SUBJECTS PAID PEERING
ARRANGEMENTS TO BLOCKING, THROTTLING, AND PAID
PRIORITIZATION
The reasons for forbearance, as the Commission states, are
because of the lack of thorough understanding of what issues
interconnection creates. The Commission states that these
reasons are threefold.209 First, the Commission understands
that the nature of Internet traffic has impacted traditional
connections, describing the global transit network, and has led
to creative arrangements, like peering, from content ISPs with
proprietary CDNs to eyeball ISPs.210 Second, the Commission
acknowledges that consumers have been harmed by
disagreements at the industry levelresulting from
commercial arrangement disputesbut third, the Commission
believes that there are inconsistencies in the record.211 The
separately.) (citing 2014 Open Internet NPRM, supra note 16, at 5647)
(omission in original).
209. 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 19, at 5610 ¶ 30. The
Commission complains about the state of the record and states that
commenters failed to explain why forbearance should not be implemented.
Commissioner Pai notes however that the public was unaware that the
question of forbearance was on the table. It was not until Chairman Wheelers
editorial on Feb. 4, 2015 that forbearance was even contemplated. Hence, the
public did not know they needed to comment on the issue, and should not be
reprimanded for failing to comment on an issue they did not know was being
contemplated at the time.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 561011 ¶ 30, 568990 ¶ 199 (Recently, Internet traffic
exchange disputes have reportedly involved not de-peering, as was more
frequently the case in the last decade, but rather degraded experiences caused
by congested ports between providers. In addition, these disputes have evolved
from conflicts that may last a few days, to disputes that have been sustained
for well over a year, and have gone from disputes between backbone service
networks, to disputes between providers of broadband Internet access service
and transit service providers, CDNs, or edge providers. The typical dispute
has involved, on one side, a large broadband provider, and on the other side, a
commercial transit provider (such as Cogent or Level 3) and/or a large CDN.
Multiple parties point out, however, that interconnection problems can harm
more than just the parties in a dispute. When links are congested and capacity
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causes of past disruption and . . . the potential for future
degradation through interconnection disputes [] are reflected in
very different narratives in the record.212 In granting
is not augmented, the networksand applications, large and small, running
over the congested links into and out of those networksexperience degraded
quality of service due to reduced throughput, increased packet loss, increased
delay, and increased jitter. At the end of the day, consumers bear the harm
when they experience degraded access to the applications and services of their
choosing due to a dispute between a large broadband provider and an
interconnecting party. Parties also assert that these disputes raise concerns
about public safety and network reliability. To address these growing
concerns, a number of parties have called for extending the rules proposed in
the 2014 Open Internet NPRM to Internet traffic exchange practices.)
(citations omitted).
212. Id. at 5611 ¶ 30. See also id. at 569091 ¶ 200 (The record reflects
competing narratives. Some edge and transit providers assert that large
broadband Internet access service providers are creating artificial congestion
by refusing to upgrade interconnection capacity at their network entrance
points for settlement-free peers or CDNs, thus forcing edge providers and
CDNs to agree to paid peering arrangements. These parties suggest that paid
arrangements resulting from artificially congested interconnection ports at
the broadband Internet access service provider network edge could create the
same consumer harms as paid arrangements in the last mile, and lead to paid
prioritization, fast lanes, degradation of consumer connections, and
ultimately, stifling of innovation by edge providers. Further, edge providers
argue that they are covering the costs of carrying this traffic through the
network, bringing it to the gateway of the Internet access service, unlike in
the past where both parties covered their own costs to reach the Tier 1
backbones where traffic would then be exchanged on a settlement-free basis.
Edge and transit providers argue that the costs of adding interconnection
capacity or directly connecting with edge providers are de minimis. Further,
they assert that traffic ratios are arbitrarily set and enforced and are not
reflective of how [broadband providers] sell broadband connections and how
consumers use them. Thus, these edge and transit providers assert that a
focus on only the last-mile portion of the Internet traffic path will fail to
adequately constrain the potential for anticompetitive behavior on the part of
broadband Internet access service providers that serve as gatekeepers to the
edge providers, transit providers, and CDNs seeking to deliver Internet traffic
to the broadband providers end users.) (citations omitted); id. at 569192 ¶
201 (In contrast, large broadband Internet access service providers assert
that edge providers such as Netflix are imposing a cost on broadband Internet
access service providers who must constantly upgrade infrastructure to keep
up with the demand. Large broadband Internet access service providers
explain that when an edge provider sends extremely large volumes of traffic to
a broadband Internet access service providere.g., through a CDN or a third-
party transit service providerthe broadband provider must invest in
additional interconnection capacity (e.g., new routers or ports on existing
routers) and middle-mile transport capacity in order to accommodate that
traffic, exclusive of last-mile costs from the broadband Internet access
providers central offices, head ends, or cell sites to end-user locations.
Commenters assert that if the broadband Internet access service provider
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forbearance to Sections 251, 255 and 256, the Commission did
not conduct a thorough analysis of the three-part forbearance
test in Section 10(a).213 Instead, it forbore from enforcing
provisions regulating interconnection due to lack of familiarity
on the issue.
Advocates of net neutrality state that the record reflects
enough evidence to prove that the Commission can and should
enforce its regulatory authority on interconnection disputes by
utilizing the unreasonably discriminatory standard and the
rules on blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization in the 2015
Open Internet Order.214
The Order, in fact, does not prohibit eyeball ISPs from
entering paid peering agreements similar to the Netflix-
Comcast agreement, which could in turn become a form of paid
prioritization.215 Therefore, enforcing the Orders rules would
absorbs these interconnection and transport costs, all of the broadband
providers subscribers will see their bills rise. They argue that this is unfair to
subscribers who do not use the services, like Netflix, that are driving the need
for additional capacity. Broadband Internet access service providers explain
that settlement-free peering fundamentally is a barter arrangement in which
each side receives something of value. These parties contend that if the other
party is only sending traffic, it is not contributing something of value to the
broadband Internet access service provider.) (alteration in original) (citations
omitted).
213. See 47 U.S.C. § 160 (Three-part Forbearance Test: (1) enforcement of
such regulation or provision is not necessary to ensure that the charges,
practices, classifications, or regulations by, for, or in connection with that
telecommunications carrier or telecommunications service are just and
reasonable and are not unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory; (2)
enforcement of such regulation or provision is not necessary for the protection
of consumers; and (3) forbearance from applying such provision or regulation
is consistent with the public interest.).
214. See, e.g., Marvin Ammori, Interconnection Disputes Are Network
Neutrality Issues (of Netflix, Comcast, and the FCC), CIRCLEID, (Apr. 7,
2014, 9:39 AM), http://www.circleid.com/posts/20140407
_interconnection_disputes_are_network_neutrality_issues.
215. See Seward, supra note 2 (Comcast was the first large terminating
access network to successfully implement a congest transit pipes peering
strategy to extract direct payment from Netflix, but it is not the only one to do
so. Since agreeing to pay Comcast, Netflix also has agreed to pay TWC, AT&T
and Verizon for interconnection . . . . Netflix is not the only edge provider to
encounter Comcasts peering strategy. In a 2011 filing with the Commission,
Voxel, a hosting company relying on Tata for interconnection with Comcasts
network, noted that [w]here broadband ISPS typically ensure that links
connecting their customers to outside networks are relatively free from
congestion, Comcast appears to be taking the opposite approach: maintaining
highly-congested links between its network and external ISP. The letter
concludes that Comcast, through its interconnection relations, had deployed
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not produce a substantially different outcome. At worst, the
outcome would be neutral, not affecting either the content or
eyeball ISPs, and, at best, it would serve the interests of the
end-users by furthering the goal of net neutrality.
1. Paid Peering May Be a Form of Paid Prioritization
Industry players believe that the application of these rules
will not influence their investment strategies or long-term
profitability, and that a light touch regime would not be
inconsistent with its robust investment strategies.216 This is
because the option of entering paid peering agreements is still
on the table.217 The Commission bans paid prioritization when
used in the context of last-mile broadband provider
agreements, but the 2015 Open Internet Order seemingly does
not prohibit paid prioritization in peering arrangements.218
Paid peering agreements are essentially indistinguishable
from paid prioritization, insofar that [f]or a substantial re-
occurring fee, [p]aid [p]eering and settlement-based
[i]nterconnection services provide their premium customers
with packet priority at the expense of non-peered and non-
interconnected traffic.219 Paid peering arrangements are based
on fast-lane access to hundreds to thousands of 10-gigabit
an ecosystem in which hosting companies such as Voxel are effectively forced
to pay Comcast to serve its broadband subscribers. In that ecosystem, it is
simply not possible for competing external providers to deliver gaming, or
streaming video services to Comcasts broadband subscribers without directly
or indirectly paying Comcast.).
216. 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 19, at 5613 ¶ 40, 5793 ¶ 414.
217. If eyeball ISPs enter into paid peering arrangements with content
ISPs, under the current 2015 Open Internet Order, content ISPs are not
prohibited from increasing subscriptions and prices to end-users to
compensate for such agreements. See Ben Popper, FCC Might Give Netflix
What It Wants and Still Allow Comcast to Sell Fast Lanes, VERGE (Oct. 31,
2014, 4:39 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2014/10/31/7140051/fcc-hybrid-plan-
net-neutrality-fast-lanes-common-carrier-title-ii.
218. See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 19, at 569293 ¶¶ 20203.
Cf. George Ou, FCCs Utter Incoherence on Paid Prioritization, DIG. SOCY
(Dec. 29, 2010), http://www.digitalsociety.org/2010/12/fccs-utter-incoherence-
on-paid-prioritization/ ([T]he FCC declared existing arrangements for
network interconnection, including existing paid peering arrangements to be
legal so long as they are not offered under the threat of blocking. Its also
noteworthy that Content Delivery Networks (CDNs), which also rely on
existing paid peering agreements, were also exempted from the ban on Paid
Prioritization.).
219. Ou, supra note 218.
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ports while bypassing the more congested Internet transit
connections.220 Because BIAS can identify the application type
(e.g. , video streaming) based on when the traffic enters the
BIAS network, discriminatory behavior is possible at or near
the Internet exchange point.221 This, in its absolute sense, is
discrimination and prioritization by payment.222 Therefore,
eyeball ISPs can still engage in paid prioritization while
abiding by the Commissions new rules.
B. A CASE-BY-CASE STANDARD: THE COMMISSIONS STOPGAP
SOLUTION TO REGULATE INTERCONNECTION
The Commission emphasized that it would forbear from
applying the new open Internet rules to interconnection
regulation because it desired more education on the issue
before ruling on it.223 This is understandable. The Commission
has already been to battle twice and has lost, thus, it is
treading lightly even after granting itself regulatory
authority.224 Further, the Commission attempts to reassure
consumers and content ISPs that other protections adequately
address [] concerns about forbearance from the [upstream]
interconnection provisions under the section 251/252
framework and under section 256. 225
These legal protections include the Commissions
regulatory authority to speak to interconnection issues on a
220. Ou, supra note 218.
221. JON M. PEHA, A MOST FAVORED NATION APPROACH TO AN OPEN
INTERNET 4 (2014), https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~xia/resources/Documents/SSRN-
id2468600-copy.pdf.
222. See Ou, supra note 218.
223. See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 19, at 5692 ¶ 202 (We do
not believe that it is appropriate or necessary to subject arrangements for
Internet traffic exchange (which are subsumed within broadband Internet
access service) to the rules we adopt today. We conclude that it would be
premature to adopt prescriptive rules to address any problems that have
arisen or may arise. It is also premature to draw policy conclusions concerning
new paid Internet traffic exchange arrangements between broadband Internet
access service providers and edge providers, CDNs, or backbone services.).
224. See id. at 5618 ¶ 59.
225. Id. at 584950 ¶ 513. The Commission then attempts to reassure
consumers and ISPs that the remaining legal protections that apply with
respect to providers of broadband Internet access service will enable [the
Commission] to act if needed to ensure that a broadband provider does not
unreasonably refuse to provide a service or Interconnect. Id.
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case-by-case basis.226 The case-by-case standard that the
Commission will use to review interconnection disputes is as
follows:
Any person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access
service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not unreasonably
interfere with or unreasonable disadvantage (i) end users ability to
select, access, and use broadband Internet access service or the
lawful Internet content, applications, services, or devices of their
choice, or (ii) edge providers ability to make lawful content,
applications, services, or devices available to end users. Reasonable
network management shall not be considered a violation of this
rule.227
Language including unreasonable interference and
unreasonable disadvantage, is subject to unpredictable
interpretations, and thus affords a case-by-case approach to
non-regulated connections and entities gives the Commission
broad regulatory authority.228 Although Commissioner Pai, in
his dissenting statement, raised concerns that conflicting
statements in the Order could result in overreaching regulatory
action by the Commission, which is precisely what the
Commission attempted to avoid when emphasizing its light
touch regulatory approach, this approach is probably what the
Commission needs to do to regain its footing.229
226. Id. at 5610 ¶¶ 2930 ([C]ommercial arrangements for the exchange of
traffic with a broadband Internet access provider are within the scope of Title
II, and the Commission will be available to hear disputes raised under
sections 201 and 202 on a case-by-case basis: an appropriate vehicle for
enforcement where disputes are primarily over commercial terms and that
involve some very large corporations, including companies like transit
providers and Content Delivery Networks (CDNs), that act on behalf of
smaller edge providers.).
227. Id. at 5609 ¶ 21 (emphasis added).
228. See id. at 5947 (The Order classifies Internet traffic exchange as a
Title II telecommunications service in everything but name.).
229. See id. at 5947 (stating that the Order followed through on the
tentative conclusion that the FCC should maintain the approach it had
previously taken so that the Part 8 Open Internet rules would not apply to
the exchange of traffic between networks, whether peering, paid peering,
content delivery networks (CDN) connection, or any other form of inter-
network transmission of data, as well as provider-owned facilities that are
dedicated solely to such interconnection and concluding that application of
the Part 8 rules to Internet traffic exchange is not warranted. . . . but the
Order then goes quite a bit further and adopts a regulatory backstop
prohibiting common carriers from engaging in unjust and unreasonable
practices, subjecting Internet traffic exchange arrangements like those
mentioned immediately above to sections 201 and 202 on a case-by-case
basis.) (citations omitted). Although Chairman Wheeler disclaimed that
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C. THE COMMISSION CAN PUBLISH CLEARER TERMDEFINITIONS
1. Internet Traffic Exchange in BIAS
While the Commission can be applauded for using a light
touch regulatory approach, ambiguity must be resolved in the
orders nomenclature, particularly in the definition of BIAS and
the scope of the Commissions forbearance.230 In reclassifying
fixed and mobile BIAS as telecommunications services, the
Commission defined BIAS as the exchange of Internet traffic
by an edge provider [also known as a content ISP] or an
intermediary with the broadband providers network.231
However, in another section of the Order, it states we find that
broadband Internet access service is a telecommunications
service and subject to sections 201, 202, and 208 . . . . But this
Order does not apply the open Internet rules to
interconnection.232 The 2015 Open Internet Orders definition
of BIAS includes the exchange of traffic, which in turn includes
interconnection, yet, in the reclassification of BIAS, the
Commission states that the rules will not apply to
interconnection.233 Other areas in the Order contain similarly
ambiguous definitions.234
[s]eparate and apart from this connectivity is the question of interconnection
(peering) between the consumers network provider and the various networks
that deliver to that ISP and that [this] proposal is all about what happens on
the broadband providers network and how the consumers connection the
Internet may not be interfered with or otherwise compromised, the
Commission adopted a standard that may encompass authority to regulate
interconnection, despite its announcement of forbearance on Section 251 and
271. Id. at 5948 (citation omitted).
230. The Commission has possibly made its rules more ambiguous than
they were in the 2010 Open Internet Order. Cf. Ou, supra note 218 (The FCC
satisfied both sides enough to get its ruling passed by a 3-2 margin by
declaring Paid Prioritization legal and illegal at the same time . . . . Paid
Prioritization as interconnection or Paid Peering is legal . . . [but] Paid
Prioritization that is enhanced or prioritized is illegal.).
231. Id. at 5685 ¶ 193.
232. Id. at 5610 ¶¶ 2930.
233. See id. at 5682 ¶ 182 ([W]hile the definition of broadband Internet
access service encompasses arrangements for the exchange of Internet traffic,
the open Internet rules we adopt today do not apply to that portion of the
broadband Internet access service.); see also id. at 5724 ¶ 282 (Our
regulations again only apply to last-mile providers of broadband services
services that are not only within our subject matter jurisdiction, but also
expressly within the terms of Section 706.).
234. In the definition of BIAS, the 2015 Order maintains its approach of
excluding from the scope of the rules the exchange of traffic between networks,
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This type of hairsplitting definition of BIAS is conducive
to statutory interpretation quandaries.235 The Commission
either attempts to afford a narrower definition to Internet
traffic exchange in the context of BIAS, namely redefining
BIAS as the connection in the last-mile, or, it maintains its
original definition of encompassing all Internet traffic exchange
points, but feebly attempts to carve out certain components of
the Internet traffic infrastructure, namely interconnection,
which includes peering practices, to ensure that industry can
maintain competition in the marketplace. Hence, because these
terms are conflicting, ambiguous, and misleading, the
Commission should publish a clear definition of its terms that
will afford content ISPs broad protection from unreasonably
and discriminatory interconnection practices.
2. End-User and Edge Provider
The Order uses other overlapping terms that demand
clarification for proper implementation. For example, the
definition of an end-user is a misnomer. In the Internet
infrastructure described above, there are two types of end-
users.236 The end-user on one end of the connection is the
customer sending the request to receive content, and the end-
user on the other end is the content ISP.237 The Order,
however, defines an end-user as any individual or entity that
uses a broadband Internet access service and an edge provider
by excluding content delivery network services and Internet backbone
services . . . from the definition of broadband Internet access service. 2015
Open Internet Order, supra note 19, at 5686 n.481. It instead applies them
only as far as the limits of a broadband providers control over the
transmission of data to or from its broadband customers . . . . Id. at 5686 ¶
194. However, arguably, broadband customers include both transit ISPs and
content ISPs, essentially covering all Internet traffic. The 2014 Open Internet
NPRM goes on to state that any edge provider-facing service it recognized
would include the flow of Internet traffic on the broadband providers own
network[s], and not how it gets to the broadband providers networks. Id. at
5948 (emphasis added). This clause refers to the last-mile connection. Thus,
the Order contains conflicting terminology and despite its forbearance
provision, it is unclear whether the scope of the rules only pertain to
connections and charges within the last-mile, or encompass all Internet
traffic.
235. Ou, supra note 218.
236. See David Post, Does the FCC Really Not Get It About the Internet?,
WASH. POST (Oct. 31, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2014/10/31/does-the-fcc-really-not-get-it-about-the-internet/.
237. Id.
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as any individual or entity that provides any content,
application, or service over the Internet, and any individual or
entity that provides a device used for accessing any content,
application, or service over the Internet.238 By definition, the
end-user as defined in the Order can encompass an edge
provider, as well.
D. THE COMMISSION CAN PROTECT INTERCONNECTION BY
BROADENING THE SCOPE OF THE RULES TO INCLUDE INTERNET
TRAFFIC EXCHANGE
The Commission also needs to clarify the scope of its rules
more definitively. The Order states that Internet traffic
exchange is a component of broadband Internet access service,
both of which meets the definition of telecommunications
service.239 Reclassifying BIAS as a telecommunications
service under Title II common carrier to prohibit blocking,
throttling, and paid prioritization may actually have little
effect on the end result because tech companies will be able to
enter into paid peering agreements to stream faster service to
its end-users.240
Although paid peering agreements may not necessarily be
at higher costs than costs originally paid to transit ISPs,
eyeball ISPs still have the option to increase prices for
interconnection.241 Therefore, if the Commission finds that the
content ISPs and end-users are being subject to discrimination
because of the rules forbearance, the Commission can broadly
interpret the definition of BIAS, specifying that the ban on paid
prioritization should apply to any and all forms of
interconnectivity between any type of ISP to ISP connection
and ISP to end-user connection, regardless of whether the
connection travels through the transit or peering
arrangements.
238. Id.
239. 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 19, at 5694 n.521.
240. See supra notes 219 and 220.
241. See Souppouris, supra note 103 (ISPs wont be allowed to serve you
Netflix movies at an artificially slower rate than other traffic, regardless of
whether or not an interconnection deal is in place . . . . But they will still be
free to pursue interconnection after the order becomes law. Its worth noting
at this point that often interconnection deals are simply commercial
arrangements and dont affect the open internet.).
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If ISPs argue for a narrower reading of the provision, the
presiding court will likely provide deference to agency
interpretation, and find that the provision demands a broader
reading in order to prohibit any form of paid partnership in
exchange for faster Internet, whether or not it is on a separate
connected line.242 Because ISPs provide BIAS, that includes a
representation to customers that they will be able to reach all
or substantially all Internet endpoints, and that
representation necessarily includes the promise to make the
interconnection arrangements necessary to allow that
access.243 Therefore, as Commissioner Pai states in his dissent,
retail [BIAS] is no longer a last mile service; it is the entire
Internet traffic path, including all Internet traffic
relationships.244
Hence, when the Commission finds itself next in court on
this issue, it should clarify that the definition of Internet
traffic exchange covers all Internet traffic, regardless of
whether the traffic travels through a backbone through a
transit ISP or through a paid peering agreement, as these are
both edge provider facing services.
E. PATIENCE IS A VIRTUETHEMERITS OF BROAD
FORBEARANCE
Net neutrality advocates may find that the Commissions
forbearance overlooked a loophole that in turn invites litigation
and leaves a high level of unpredictability and uncertainty in
interconnection disputes, but the Commissions forbearance
may actually be a deliberate and astute measure. As the record
shows, there are conflicting narratives about how
interconnection should be regulated, if at all.245 Because no
242. SeeWong, supra note 116, at 687 n.82.
243. 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 19, at 5993.
244. Id. Other dissenting commissioners have done thorough analysis on
this issue. Commissioner OReilly mentioned that the NTCA observed the
Commission should not and cannot legally or logically distinguish between the
kinds of broadband transmission (e.g., last-mile, middle-mile, etc.) in
classifying broadband as a telecommunications service. If data [is] conveyed
from points A to Z or exchanged between networks of any kind, those
functions are broadband transmissionand the mere location of that
transmission at a given point in the network ecosystem is irrelevant by itself
to regulatory classification. Id. at 6000.
245. Id. at 5690 ¶ 200. See also id. at 5613 ¶ 40 ([I]nvestment analysts
have issued reports concluding that Title II with appropriate forbearance is
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lawsuits are pending which involve the Commission and paid
peering arrangements, the level of urgency to speak on this
issue is relatively low. Taking a few years to observe the
relationship between eyeball ISPs, content ISPs, and the
development of CDNs is likely the most sensible course of
action. The Commission is wise in allowing the market to
decide what interconnection options are available to them in
light of the 2015 Open Internet Order. If a challenger comes
forth, likely a transit ISP, the Commission will have the ability
to protect the entities subject to harm by broadening the scope
of its rules. If and when this happens, the Commission can
broaden the scope of its rules by clarifying its terms and
broadening the scope of its rules to include protection of the
entirety of the Internet traffic exchange.
III. CONCLUSION
Many content providers have voiced concerns that the
Commission may have overlooked an important loophole in the
2015 Open Internet Order by forbearing to enforce a majority of
the Title II provisions, including Sections 251 and 271. They
contend that eyeball ISPs can continue engaging in unjust and
unreasonably discriminatory behavior by creating paid peering
agreements with content ISPs and note that interconnection
regulation is necessary for the protection of the consumers and
that forbearance is inconsistent with the public interest.246
Through the 2015 Open Internet Order, although the
Commission has constructed a substantively imperfect set of
unlikely to alter broadband provider conduct or have any negative effect on
their value or future profitability . . . . Sprint . . . does not believe that a light
touch application of Title II, including appropriate forbearance, would harm
the continued investment in, and deployment of, mobile broadband services.).
That these costs will be passed on to end-users is speculative at this point, and
is an overstatement. There is no evidence that during the Netflix-Comcast
dispute, Netflix had increased costs in any shape or form to end-users.
246. See supra notes 219, 220, and 243. Interconnection regulation cannot
be distinguished from the net neutrality issue. See PEHA, supra note 221, at
11 ([I]nterconnection practices have been changing, and some have argued
that Open Internet rules should be expanded to address interconnection . . . .
It is theoretically possible that an Internet provider could use interconnection
agreements in a way that harms the Open Internet . . . . If this occurred, it
could undermine the virtuous cycle of innovation and expansion, because
smaller providers with new applications cannot easily establish direct peering
and are more dependent on transit.).
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standards, it may have finally perfected its balancing act.
Through the new rules, the Commission attempts to appease
the general public from the fear of unreasonable practices by
eyeball ISPs. Through broad forbearance, the Commission tries
to please eyeball ISPs by providing an alternative route to
enter unregulated business relationships. Moreover, the
Commissions authority to address interconnection issues on a
case-by-case basis affords both sides of the battle time to
strategize and put their best foot forward when it comes time to
meet in court.247 If the Commission finds that extending its
scope of regulatory authority is necessary to maintain its
standard of reasonableness and anti-discrimination, it can
broaden the scope of its rules by clarifying the definitions of
terms including BIAS, Internet traffic exchange, and end-users,
and eventually enforce Sections 251 and 271 in order to ensure
a fully neutral Internet.
247. See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 19, at 5611 ¶¶ 513, 31
([T]he best approach is to watch, learn, and act as required, but not intervene
now, especially not with prescriptive rules.); See also Jeff Sommer, What the
Net Neutrality Rules Say, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/03/12/technology/net-neutrality-
rules-explained.html (It says that it is not entirely clear about how it ought to
proceed.).
